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1 Introduction
This thesis presents an analysis with an agent-based model on the links be-
tween inequality and macroeconomic dynamics in an environment characterized
by credit rationing. It investigates how different scenarios of inequality can im-
pact on the evolution of aggregate income. On the policy side, this work tries
to understand the possible role redistributive fiscal policies can have in the econ-
omy, and whether they can work as automatic stabilizers. The model presented
by Napoletano, Roventini and Gaffard (2015) is expanded and adapted to this
analysis.
In the last decades, most advanced countries have experienced a rising trend
in inequality of both income and wealth. This process has culminated with the
example of contemporary United States exhibiting an extremely concentrated dis-
tribution of income and wealth, with the top 10% earning 50% of total income and
owning 70% of total wealth (Piketty, 2014). Only recently, a number of economists
have rediscovered the importance of distributional issues for the understanding
of macroeconomic dynamics. The public opinion has also started to be more
aware of the issue of the top percentile earning and owning an increasing share
of respectively income and wealth. The manifestation of this phenomenon has
been the great success Piketty’s “Capital in the Twenty First Century” received
when published in 2014. However, a lot of work remains to do in understanding
the links between inequality and macroeconomic dynamics.
Empirically, both wealth and income have followed a u-shaped evolution since
1900, both in Europe and US, starting with highly concentrated distributions at
the beginning of last century. After the two World Wars inequality was at its
lowest levels, until the 1970s, when it started rising again, reaching record high
levels in 2010.
From a theoretical point of view, many schools of thought, as the Classical,
Marxian, Keynesian and Post-Keynesian have been aware of the importance of
distributional issues for the understanding of economic dynamics. Neoclassical
economics, which identifies mainstream economics, has, however, for decades al-
most completely neglected this issue. Only recently, some neoclassical models
have tried to take into account some form of heterogeneity, although mainly con-
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sidering pre-determined categories of agents (Fagiolo and Roventini, 2016).
After the crisis, inequality has been central in most economic debates. Some
economists as Stiglitz (2012) and Fitoussi (2013) claim that rising inequality
in the last decades could be at the roots of the Great Recession. In line with
Kaldor’s theory, they find in the widespread increase of inequality the cause of a
depressed aggregate demand. In fact, rising inequality transfers resources from
households characterized by a high propensity to consume to households with a
lower propensity to consume. On the aggregate, this results in lower consumption.
This lack of demand was not visible prior to the crisis, because of an increase in
households debt. In fact, monetary policy maintained low interest rates, which
allowed private debt to increase beyond sustainable levels. It was only through
borrowing that most households were able to satisfy their consumption needs.
This, together with a continuous search for high-return investments by those at
the top of the income distribution, caused the explosion of the bubble.
It is therefore crucial to understand distributional dynamics and the possible
impacts they can have at aggregate level (Stiglitz, 2011).
In order to do so, households heterogeneity is a crucial aspect to take into ac-
count. Therefore, the representative agent assumption used in standard theories
fails at explaining inequality and its impact on macroeconomic dynamics. For
this reason, agent-based modeling is used in this analysis in order to take into
account heterogeneity and interactions among agents with bounded rationality.
Agent-based modeling can be used as a laboratory in order to analyze complex
emergent properties of the system that stem from repeated microinteractions of
simple entities (Kirman, 1998).
This agent-based model is characterized by multiple households which are
heterogeneous in a number of characteristics such as income, wealth and access
to credit. Starting from a quite egalitarian income distribution, the economy is
hit after some periods by an inequality shock, which affects households income
distribution, making it more skewed. In particular, three different types of in-
equality shocks are introduced, ranging from one characterized by low inequality
in the income distribution to one generating a highly skewed distribution. The
dynamics of the system are analyzed relatively to different degrees of government
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intervention. Moreover, in addition to comparing different intensities of direct
government consumption, this version of the model adds the possibility of intro-
ducing a subsidy targeted towards low-income households, as a response to the
crisis.
Simulation results permit to analyze the response of the economy to the in-
equality shock, in terms of aggregate income, fraction of constrained borrowers
and evolution of fiscal multipliers.
What emerges from this analysis is that, as the evolution of aggregate income
is demand-driven, in a Keynesian vein, the inequality shock leads to a recession
and to a stagnation of GDP, which stays at lower steady-state levels after the
economy is hit. In fact, when a higher degree of inequality is introduced, many
households do not have sufficient resources in order to satisfy their consumption
plans and they have to ask for credit. Credit supply is allocated through a pecking
order (Dosi et al. 2013, 2015) that depends on the ratio between a household’s
wealth and his credit demand. This leads to the emergence of credit rationing in
the economy and, thus, to lower demand. On the other side, some few households
find themselves with an extremely high income, but they consume only a small
fraction of it, such that what emerges is that they have a lower effective marginal
propensity to consume, as also confirmed by empirical evidence (Jappelli and
Pistaferri, 2013; Krueger, Mitman and Perri, 2016). Government expenditure
can dampen the fall in aggregate income, helping households in repairing their
balance sheets and sustaining household consumption.
The fall in aggregate income resulting from the introduction of an inequality
shock is higher, the higher is the degree of inequality introduced. In fact, in the
high inequality scenario, for every type of public policy considered, the recession
is more severe and output stays at lower steady state levels. In fact, higher
inequality is associated with a higher fraction of credit constrained households in
the economy.
The introduction of a subsidy targeted towards low-income households works
as an automatic stabilizer in the economy, in line with McKay and Reis (2016),
considerably dampening the recession for all inequality shock scenarios consid-
ered. This positive effect of the subsidy is strongly amplified when the resources
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collected by the government and used for redistributive aims are higher. More-
over, fiscal multipliers associated with the subsidy are significantly higher than
the corresponding ones in presence of direct government consumption. In other
words, the subsidy is more effective in dampening the negative effects of the shock,
with respect to direct government consumption. In fact, the subsidy allows poor
households to repair their balance sheets and to increase consumption.
The thesis is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents a summary
of the empirical evidence on the main variables of interest, as wealth, income,
divided between capital and labor income, together with some considerations
about some main findings about the correlation between inequality, redistribu-
tion, macroeconomic dynamics and growth. Section 3 presents some main theo-
ries in the history of economic thought that have dealt with distributional issues,
some more recent neoclassical models and some new frontier theories presented
in the last few years. In Section 4, agent-based modeling is presented as a tool to
investigate the role of inequality and fiscal policy in explaining macroeconomic
dynamics, together with a short survey of agent-based models dealing with such
issues. Section 5 presents the model utilized in this analysis and shows the main
simulation results. Finally, in Section 6, some main conclusions are drawn from
the analysis.
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2 Empirical evidence
In this section, some empirical evidence on the evolution of wealth and income
inequalities will be presented. While the former is a stock corresponding to the
total wealth owned at a given point in time, accumulated in previous years, the
latter is a flow, corresponding to the quantity of goods produced and distributed
in a given period. I will mainly focus the analysis on advanced countries in the
twentieth century and in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Thereafter,
I will introduce some empirical findings on the correlation between inequality,
macroeconomic dynamics and growth, together with some studies on the links
between redistributive policies and the long-run performance of the economy.
I will hereby report the main conclusions of this chapter. Most studies in the
literature find that inequalities, both with respect to income and wealth, have
been growing in the last decades. In general, a stylized fact that emerges from
these studies is that the distribution of wealth tends to be more unequal than the
distribution of income.
Starting with wealth, and taking capital/income ratios as a measure of the
stock of wealth in an economy, what emerges is a clear u-shaped evolution over
time in most advanced countries. In fact, the ratio from being extremely high
at the beginning of the twentieth century, fell after the destructions of the two
World Wars. Since the 1980s, wealth has increased faster than income in most
advanced countries, and therefore the trend in the capital/income ratio has been
upward. In particular, the largest fortunes grew much more rapidly than average
wealth (Piketty, 2014).
The same pattern of evolution characterizes the concentration of wealth in the
population. From being highly concentrated in the top at the beginning of the
twentieth century, wealth became more evenly distributed after the two World
Wars and the Great Depression. The concentration of wealth in the hands of few
rich increased from the 1970s on. United States is an example of a highly unequal
distribution of wealth. In fact, in 2010 the top 10% held 70% of total wealth.
Income, which can be divided between income from capital and income from
labor, has also followed a similar evolution in the last century, however with big
differences among advanced countries. From being highly concentrated at the
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beginning of the twentieth century, it became more equally distributed after the
two World Wars. Possible explanations of this trend are given by the big capital
destructions during the wars which prevented many rentiers from receiving high
incomes from their capital, and the introduction of public policies after the wars.
The degree of concentration of income in the top decile increased significantly
again starting from the end of the 1970s, and reached particularly high levels
in the US, while it stayed lower in Scandinavian countries, for example. These
significant differences across countries suggest that public policies and institutions
matter for the evolution of inequalities.
In particular, for what concerns capital income, defined as rents, dividends,
interests, royalties, profits, capital gains, etc., its share in total income decreased
significantly in the period starting with the end of WWI until the 1970s (Bengts-
son and Waldenstro¨m, 2015). Since 1975, capital shares in income have then
increased in most advanced countries. The concentration of capital income as
well was much lower after the two World Wars with respect to the beginning of
the century. A possible explanation of this evolution is given by the destructions
of huge quantities of capital during the wars that also implied lower incomes
derived from capital. Furthermore, in the following period, capital income con-
centration stayed low for some decades. It then started to rise again starting from
the 1980s.
A possible explanation of such a trend is that in the first decades after the
wars public policies prevented the restoration of big fortunes. However, more
liberal policies introduced starting from the 1980s, made capital more profitable
and introduced increasing possibilities for speculative gains. The concentration
of capital income has increased in the last decade also due to the presence of
different returns on capital and some increasing returns for individuals owning
big quantities of wealth.
Turning to labor income, what emerges is that labor shares has been falling
in the last decades. Moreover, there has been a trend in labor income which is
similar to the one for total income distribution. In fact, also for labor income,
inequalities were high at the beginning of the twentieth century both in Europe
and in the US, falling until the 1970s and rising again after that. What emerges
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is that the wage gap has widened, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries, and
that the share of income going to the top decile has increased in the last decades,
mainly due to the explosion of high-executives’ remunerations. Differences across
countries are remarkable, again suggesting an important role for institutions and
politics in shaping these mechanisms.
In Section 2.1 I will introduce some methodological considerations about the
measurement of income and wealth inequality. I will then procede with an analysis
of the evolution of wealth in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 focuses on income inequality,
both deriving from capital and labor.
Section 2.4 shows how inequality may affect macroeconomic stability. For
instance, some studies find that some major crisis were preceded by a period of
increasing inequality, and analyze this phenomenon. About the links between
inequality and growth two main streams of literature are reported, the first iden-
tified by those who find that inequality positively affects growth, the second
composed by studies that find the relationship to be negative.
In section 2.5 empirical evidence is again contrasting, with some studies find-
ing a negative effect of redistributive policies on growth, and some other studies
finding the correlation to be positive.
2.1 Methodology
In this section I will often refer to the work of Piketty (2014), Capital in the
Twenty-First Century, in which distribution deciles and percentiles are used in
order to get a rigorous analysis of the distributions. It is therefore the case to
introduce a brief discussion on why this methodology can be useful.
In many official reports, the Gini coefficient is often used to describe the
evolution of inequality in a given country. The Gini coefficient can give a large
picture of the situation of a country, but it is a too synthetic index in order to
grasp the multidimensionality of inequality and the mechanisms at work in detail.
It includes inequalities with respect to labor income and with respect to capital,
mixed. Furthermore, it could be misleading to compare Gini coefficients referring
to different countries and times, as the underlying data could be not comparable.
For example, income from capital could be included in some countries, but not
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in others.
Another widespread measure of inequality is the P90/P10 index. This index
(or similar), often used in reports by the OECD or statistical agencies, may
be useful to get a broad picture of the distribution, but it totally ignores the
top 10 percent of the distribution, which may provide interesting information
about the degree of inequality in a country. For the top 10 percent the data
are often imperfect, but Piketty suggests that these difficulties can be overcome
utilizing historical data as those in the World Top Incomes Database (WTID).
The shares, used by Piketty, among others, give a much more complete picture,
which attempts to be more close to reality.
Indeed, the top of the distribution matters from a macroeconomic perspective
since it owns a huge share of aggregate wealth and accounts for a large fraction
of its growth. In fact, in most countries, the changes, and particularly the recent
increases, have been concentrated at the very top (Atkinson et al., 2011). Almost
half of the aggregate wealth accumulation in the period 1986-2012 in the US has
been due to the top 0.1 % (Saez Zucman, 2014). Atkinson et al. (2011) show
that the share going to the top 0.1 % has more than quadrupled from 2.6 % to
12.3 % over the period 1976-2007.
Data about the top 0.1 % are usually hard to achieve with surveys as extremely
rich (and poor) people tend to be undersampled as they don’t want to disclose
information about their income. That’s why in many studies tax data are used.
Piketty uses the World Top Incomes Database for his analysis of the evolution
of income and wealth. This database has been the fruit of the contribution of
over fifty researchers in the last fifteen years, and it is based on income tax data,
before tax.
With these data, capital income is therefore underestimated partly due to
the erosion of capital income from the progressive income tax base (Atkinson et
al., 2011), as, over time, many sources of capital income, as for example interest
income, have been either taxed separately or fully exempted, partly due to tax
evasion, particularly for what concerns investment income. This kind of income
can, in fact, be hidden in the so called “tax heavens”, and it is easier to hide than
income from wages.
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The important implication of this is that top incomes are underestimated, as
it is the upper decile that owns the greatest amount of capital income. Ideally,
one should impute excluded capital income back to each income group, but this
is often difficult to do because of lack of data. Piketty claims that, probably, the
overall evolution of income inequality would not change much, as under-reporting
of capital income was a widespread phenomenon also a century ago. Roine and
Waldenstro¨m (2010), in the case of Sweden, also argue that there is no reason
to believe that under-reporting has changed dramatically over time. They argue
that, while the incentives to under-report have increased, as tax rates have gone
up over time, administrative controls have also been improved. In the case of Italy,
Alvaredo and Pisano (2010) conclude that, even if tax evasion is an important
phenomenon in the country, it is unlikely that evasion from self-employment and
small business income account for the gap in the top incomes between Italy and
Anglo-Saxon countries. On the other hand, inequality measured by these before-
tax income data could be reduced once taxes and transfers are paid and when we
move from individual to household incomes.
Another issue is that, while rents, interest and dividends are treated in a
similar way in different countries, capital gains are often treated differently. While
in French data they are not reported, they are included in US tax data. This can
change a bit the results as capital gains are highly concentrated in the very top
of the distribution. Another limitation of tax data is that you cannot attribute
a certain income from capital to inherited capital or to capital accumulated by
an individual during his lifetime through labor income accumulation. However,
it is reasonable to think that for very large fortunes, inheritance is likely to play
a crucial role.
Finally, Atkinson et al. (2011) point out that also differences between units
of analysis in different studies can make comparability difficult. Units of anal-
ysis may be individuals, tax units combining incomes of husbands and wives,
and households. For example, the increasing labor force participation of females
means that the joint distribution of incomes is now more relevant than before,
and the ageing of the population implies that we can find more single elderly
people in the distribution.
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Keeping in mind these limitations, I will in the next sections present the
results obtained in different studies, most of them based on before-tax income
data, on the different dimensions of income distribution and inequality.
Moreover, an analysis of the evolution of wealth in the last century in the
main rich countries is presented. The focus will be on recent works, mainly
relying on data from national balance sheets. This is a relatively new method
of studying wealth, since lack of data has been a major issue for research in this
field. Only in 1993 the System of National Accounts, giving the international
standards for national accounting, introduced guidelines for the measurement of
wealth. One of the first comprehensive studies of the topic is the one by Piketty
and Zucman (2014), who use these stock, which include all non-financial and
financial assets and liabilities held by each sector of the economy (households,
government, corporations), in order to measure the stocks of private and national
wealth at current market value.
2.2 Wealth inequality
Wealth refers to the stock of net worth, defined as the sum of assets minus
liabilities at a given point in time.
A useful measure of the stock of wealth present within a country is given by
the capital-income ratios 1. In analyzing his data, Piketty detects a clear pattern
in advanced countries’ capital-income ratios . Taking as an example France,
national capital was about seven times national income from 1700 to 1910. The
capital-income ratio then fell to less than 3 in the period going from 1910 to
1950, most probably because of the occurrence of two World Wars and the Great
Depression. This ratio then rose up to almost 6 in 2010. An analogous pattern is
found for Great Britain. United States’ capital-income ratio was about 3 in the
late 18th century and it then increased to 5 in 1910. It was falling a bit in 1920,
but soon reached 5-5.5 in 1930. In 1950 it decreased to below 4, and was then as
high as 4.5 in 2010. He also makes a prediction about further rising ratios in the
future.
Piketty and Zucman (2014) claim that the U-shaped evolution of European
1The terms wealth and capital are used interchangeably in Piketty (2014).
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wealth-income ratios can be explained by the change in relative asset prices,
driven by changes in capital policies. After World War I, asset prices fell due to
the introduction of some “anti-capital” policies, i. e. capital controls, such as
transaction taxes, foreign exchange controls, which restricts the amount of foreign
currency or local currency that can be traded, limits on the allowed volume for
international trade of financial assets. From the 1980s these restrictions were
removed, contributing to the rise of asset prices. Another explaining factor they
point out is the slowdown of productivity and population growth.
Figure 1: Private and public capital in rich countries, 1970-2010 (Piketty 2014,
p. 184)
In Figure 1 it is clear how the evolution of wealth is following an upward trend
since the 1970s in all major developed countries. Splitting up capital between
private and public capital, it is interesting to see that this rise has affected only
the former. For what concerns Italy, for example, private capital rose from 240
percent in 1970 to 680 percent in 2010, while public capital decreased from 20 to
-70 percent of national income 2.
The rising quantity of private capital in the last decades, indicates an increas-
ing importance of wealth with respect to labor income in the economy 3. Since
wealth is concentrated in the hands of few rich people, this suggests the presence
of an increasing level of high inequality. Data from the European Central Bank
(Franzini and Pianta, 2016) indeed show that, while the bottom 20 percent of
2For a deeper analysis on these issues see Piketty (2014), chapter 5.
3A discussion about differences between capital and wealth and issues in calculating it can be
found in Stiglitz, J. (2015), The measurement of wealth: recessions,sustainability and inequality.
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Europeans have a net wealth of basically 0, the richest 20 percent of Europeans
own 68 percent of total wealth, of which the top 5 percent own 37.2 percent.
Wealth inequality has worsened also in the Nordic countries, generally consid-
ered more egalitarian, but the strong presence of a welfare state makes it possible
for households to avoid conditions of poverty in the majority of cases.
Wealth is highly concentrated in most advanced countries. Also for the case
of the United States, a survey for the years 2010-2011 carried out by the Federal
Reserve, estimates that the top 10 percent own 72 percent of the total wealth in
the United States, whereas the bottom 50 percent own just 2 percent. Further-
more, it is important to recall that most self-reporting surveys underestimate the
wealth of the richest wealth-owners.
Piketty (2014) shows that within the top 10 percent the composition of wealth
varies significantly. Nearly everyone belonging to the group owns a real estate, but
the weight it has on the total wealth decreases the further up in the distribution
one gets. While for the lowest 9 percent of the group real estate accounts for
half of the wealth, in the top 1 percent shares of stock or partnership account
for almost the whole fortune. Financial and business assets is thus the primary
source of wealth of the very rich. For the middle 40 percent, the one between the
bottom 50 percent and the top 10 percent, wealth is mainly determined by the
primary residence they own and some savings. The bottom 50 percent usually
own close to nothing.
The evolution of the distribution of wealth in the last century started with
societies in 1900-1910 in which the richest 10 percent owned 90 percent of the
nation’s wealth, for what concerns France, Britain, Sweden and all the countries
Piketty has data for. More strikingly, the top 1 percent always owned more than
50 percent of the nation’s wealth. The middle 40 percent owned between 5 and
10 percent of the total, depending on the country, while the bottom 50 percent
owned less than 5 percent, as nowadays. There was no middle class, as the bottom
90 percent of the wealth distribution was more or less equally poor.
The emergence of a patrimonial middle class occurred later in the century,
as today they own more than before, while for the bottom 50 percent nothing
has really changed from 1900 to now. However, the middle 40 percent includes
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four times as many people as the top 10 percent, and they own only one-half to
one-third of their wealth. This suggests that even if some change has occurred
for the middle class, inequality in the wealth distribution is still extreme.
Figure 2: Top 0.1 % wealth share in the United States, 1913-2012 (Saez and
Zucman 2014, p. 49)
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the share of wealth going to the top 0.1% in
the United States. Starting from a very high level at the beginning of the past
century, the share shrank considerably with the 1929 Great Depression and the
two World Wars. It then started to rise rapidly since 1980, and has today reached
pre-war levels.
Saez and Zucman (2014) also performed a study about the distribution of
households’ wealth, defined as current market value of all financial and non-
financial assets owned by households net of all their debts 4, in the US since 1913
based on income tax returns data together with flow of funds data. They use the
capitalization method on incomes reported by taxpayers, in order to take into
account assets that do not generate taxable income. The distribution of wealth
in US in 2012 looks as follows: the bottom 90 % own a share of total wealth of
22.8 %; the next 9 % hold a share of 35.4 %; the top 1 % owns 42 % of total
wealth; the top 0.1 % holds 22 % of total wealth, as much as the bottom 90 %.
This distribution is the result of a U-shaped evolution of top wealth shares in the
last century, as we can see in Figure 2, that depicts the trend for the top 0.1 %.
4The definition includes for example pension wealth, but excludes human capital, wealth pro-
duced by non-profit organizations, because of the difficulty of attributing it to specific families,
and consumer durables.
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The top 10 % has evolved in a similar way: after a peak of 84% in the 1920s,
it was of 63 % in the 1980s, then rising up to 77.2 % in 2012, with this rise being
mainly due to the increase of the wealth of the very rich. The top 0.1 % wealth
share was indeed about 63 % at the beginning of the century, steadily falling until
the end of the 1970s, then rising again from around 7 % in 1979 to 22 % in 2012,
almost reaching the 1929 levels.
On the contrary, the bottom 90 % wealth share first increased from 20 % in
the 1920s to 35 % in the mid-1980s, driven by the accumulation of housing wealth
and pension wealth, and then steadily declined down to 23 % in 2012. Moreover,
the bottom half of the distribution always owns close to zero net wealth, such
that the share of the bottom 90% is the same as the one owned by top 50-90%
families. Net housing wealth of the bottom 90 % accounted for about 15% of total
household wealth in the period 1950s-1980s, while now for 5-6%, due to a rise
in debts (mortgages, students loans, credit card). On aggregate, household debt
indeed increased from the equivalent of 75% of national income in the mid-1980s
to 135% of national income in 2009, and it is close to 110% of national income in
2012.
Table 1: Inequality of capital ownership across time and space (Piketty 2014, p.
248)
Table 1, taken from Piketty (2014), presents some examples of different de-
grees of capital ownership inequality, ranging from a never-observed low inequality
society to a very high inequality context, as the one Piketty sees as a plausible one
if the trend continues as nowadays. Having a look at the realized examples, we
can compare medium-inequality societies, as the Scandinavian ones in the 1970s
and 1980s to medium-high European societies in 2010, and the high-inequality
economy of United States in 2010 for what concerns wealth. The differences are
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remarkable.
A phenomenon worth mentioning is that the age composition of the wealth
distribution has changed during the last decades. Wealth held by families in
which the head of the family is aged 65 or more has slightly increased, but little
compared to the rise in the fraction of elderly families in the total population,
which was from 18% in 1960 to 25% in 2010. The top 0.1% of the wealth distribu-
tion is getting younger, maybe partly due to a rise in large inheritances (Piketty,
2014), and their labor income has increased ( i. e. compensation of employees,
including fringe benefits, together with the labor share of non-corporate profits
before tax), making them more able to accumulate fortunes. This is also in line
with Saez and Zucman’s (2014) analysis that finds that top wealth holders are
generally younger today than in the 1960s and earn a higher fraction of total
labor income in the economy. From earning slightly less than 0.5% (5 times the
average labor income) of all labor income before 1970, top 0.1 % earned a share
of 3.1% (31 times the average labor income) in 2012. Considering that they also
have much more income from capital, their share of total (labor plus capital)
pre-tax income has increased, from about 3% in 1960 to 8% in 2012.
Piketty claims that the very high concentration of capital is explained mainly
by the importance of inherited wealth and its cumulative effects: for example,
it is easier to save if you inherit an apartment and do not have to pay rent.
The fact that the return on capital often takes on extreme values also plays a
significant role in this dynamic process. Inheritance is indeed gaining increasing
importance: in France, for example, the annual flow of inheritance was about
20-25% of national income between 1820 and 1910, it became then 5% in 1950,
and was back to 15% in 2010 (Piketty, 2011).
Inheritance matters in the analysis of wealth distribution since intergenera-
tional transfers account for at least 50 - 60% of total wealth accumulation (Gale
and Scholz, 1994) in the US, and it is potentially an important transmission chan-
nel of wealth inequality across generations. These considerations are consistent
with the fact that wealth mobility is quite static. In fact, Hurst et al. (1998),
using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data to analyze wealth mo-
bility between 1984 and 1994, document that most of the mobility occurs in the
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mid-range deciles, while the top and bottom ones show high persistence.
Furthermore, an important factor explaining the wealth dynamics is that the
saving rate of wealthy people is high (De Nardi, 2015). Many dynamic models
used for quantitative policy evaluation, based on the Bewley model, in which
people save to self-insure against idiosyncratic shocks, imply that once households
get rich, they dissave. In these models, precautionary savings are the key force
driving wealth concentration. This implies that when households get sufficiently
rich their saving rate decreases and then turns negative.
De Nardi points out that these models are not able to generate the degree
of wealth concentration that is observed in the data. In fact, available data for
US suggest that rich people save at high rates, explaining the emergence and
persistence of large fortunes. Also Saez and Zucman (2014) find that saving rates
tend to rise with wealth, as the bottom 90 percent in the wealth distribution save
on average 3 percent of their income, whereas the next 9 percent save 15 percent
and the top 1 percent save 20-25 percent of their income.
2.3 Income inequality
Income can be defined as the flow of money going to the factors of production,
labor and capital, in a given period of time, generally a year. This section, first
analyzes income inequalities in general, and then focuses on each component of
income, capital and labor, more in depth.
An empirical regularity Piketty finds in his book is that inequality with respect
to capital is always greater than inequality with respect to labor. Piketty finds
it in all countries in all periods for which he has available data. The upper 10
percent of the labor income distribution generally receives 25-30 percent of total
labor income, while the top 10 percent of the capital income distribution always
own at least 50 percent of all capital. Moreover, the bottom 50 percent of the
labor income distribution receive between one-quarter and one-third of total labor
income, whereas the bottom 50 percent of the wealth distribution in many cases
own nothing at all, in some cases almost nothing. For Piketty (2014), as capital
income is more unequally distributed than labor income, a transfer from labor
income to capital income will increase overall inequality.
22
Maybe the first serious statistical attempt to analyze income distribution was
made by Simon Kuznets, who focused on United States in the period 1913-1948.
He worked on historical series of income distribution based on two main data
sources: US federal income tax returns and his own estimates of US national
income. The data were reporting a sharp reduction in US income inequality in
the period, with a share of annual national income going to the upper decile
declining from 45-50 percent in 1913 to 30-35 percent in the late 1940s.
This analysis gave birth to his inverted U-shaped theory of inequality for which
inequality could be expected to follow a “bell curve” over the course of industri-
alization, increasing in the first phases, since only a small part of the population
has the possibility to benefit from the new wealth industrialization brings, while
automatically decreasing later on, as a progressively larger fraction of the pop-
ulation benefits from economic growth. The basic problem with Kuznets’ work
is that it focuses mainly on labor income, while at least for what concerns top
shares, it is crucial to take into account both capital and labor income, and their
interaction (Atkinson et al., 2011).
Piketty shows that the two World Wars, and the public policies that followed
from them, played a central role in reducing inequalities in the twentieth cen-
tury. In France physical destructions were huge. About one-third of the capital
stock was destroyed during the First World War and about two-thirds during the
Second World War. The UK lost much of its capital income from abroad during
the wars (Atkinson et al., 2011). Corporate taxes rose and restrictions on the
payment of dividends were imposed during the wars. There was nothing natural
or spontaneous about this process, in contrast to the optimistic predictions of
Kuznets’ theory.
Another mechanism that was at work in the 1940s was the so-called “Great
Compression” in the US wage structure, with a relatively egalitarian wage dis-
tribution (Goldin and Margo, 1992). Piketty shows that inequality began to
rise sharply again since the 1970s and 1980s, with significant variation between
countries, suggesting that institutional and political differences played a key role.
Indeed, political variables may be relevant for explaining differences across coun-
tries, reflecting political climate and traditions. Roine and Waldenstro¨m (2010)
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draw a distinction between liberal (Anglo-Saxon) welfare states, corporatist-
conservative (continental European) welfare states, and social democratic (Scan-
dinavian) welfare states, that may be influential on the development of inequality.
Income inequality is the result of inequality of income from labor and inequal-
ity of income from capital. The relation between these two is another decisive
factor for the total inequality in the society. The greater the correlation between
capital and income of a person is, the greater is total inequality. In traditional
societies the correlation between the two inequalities was often negative, because
the more you owned, the less you needed to work, getting almost nothing of labor
income. In modern societies the correlation is usually positive but never perfect
(Piketty, 2014).
As labor income generally accounts for two-thirds to three-quarters of total
national income, inequality of total income is closer to inequality of labor income
than of capital income. The top decile of the total income distribution got about
25 percent of national income in the most egalitarian economies in Scandinavian
countries in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas in the more inegalitarian societies, as
the case of the United States today, the top decile receives about 50 percent of
national income (Piketty, 2014). All distributions Piketty presents are before
taxes. Depending on whether the tax system is progressive or regressive, the
after-tax distribution may be more or less egalitarian. In general, however, net
inequality has risen in the OECD over the past decades, as redistribution has not
kept pace with the rise in market inequality (OECD, 2011).
Following Piketty’s reasoning, there exists mainly two ways of getting to the
situation of a society with a highly unequal distribution of total income: through
a “society of rentiers”, in which inherited wealth plays a crucial role and where
wealth concentration is extreme, typical of the French Ancien Re´gime and the
Belle E´poque in Europe; through a “society of superstars”, in which people be-
longing to the very top of the income hierarchy are located there thanks to very
high incomes from labor, as recently appears to happen in the United States.
These two types of inequalities can coexist and usually both forces are at work
in each society.
Following the evolution of inequality in the last century, two major phenomena
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strike: the reduction of inequality due to the shocks in the period 1914-1945 of the
two World Wars and the increase in inequality since the 1970s that has followed
different paths in different countries, suggesting that politics and institutions may
again have played a crucial role.
Focusing on Europe and US, some examples taken from Atkinson et al. (2011)
on the evolution of the top 1% share, starting from the post-war period, are
hereby reported. Germany has not witnessed any significant change, as the top
1% claimed 11.6% of total national income in 1949, while in 2005 it got 11.1%, and
the same yields for Sweden and France but at lower levels, respectively around
6-7% and 8-9%. United Kingdom’s top 1% saw its share rise significantly from
11.47 to 14.25 in the period. The same yields for Norway, but at lower levels,
indeed from 8.88 to 11.82%. In United States the increase was extreme, from
10.95% in 1949 to 17.42% in 2005. For Spain and Italy the data are incomplete.
For what concerns the period 1919-1949, top incomes were much lower in 1949
than in 1919 in the great majority of countries.
Piketty (2014) reports that, overall, in the last century inequality of total in-
come in France has dropped, as the top 10 percent of the total income distribution
owned 45-50 percent just before World War I, while it claims 30-35 percent today.
This compression is almost totally due to diminished top incomes from capital,
such that focusing on wage distribution the level of inequality has remained pretty
stable. Kuznets’ theory fails as no structural process have operated. It was war
that compressed inequalities, destroying large amount of capital owned by the
“rentiers”, together with the Great Depression and new public policies, which led
to a sharp drop of the capital/income ratio between 1914 and 1945.
Today the top of the income distribution is constituted by “supermanagers”,
or more in general by people who live on their highly paid salaries. The first 9
percent of the top decile mainly rely on income from labor today, while in the
top 1 percent capital income increasingly becomes the main source of income.
Furthermore, a very large share of capital belonging to the upper decile is in
form of dividends and interest from mobile capital, such that large fortunes are
primarily made of financial assets.
For instance, in Italy the increase in top income shares since the mid 1980s
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were mainly driven by top wages and self-employment income. In 1976, earnings
accounted for less than 10 percent of the income of the top 0.01 percent, but
by 2004 it had increased to over 20 percent (Alvaredo, Pisano, 2010). Similarly,
in Spain earnings accounted for less than 20 percent for the top 0.01 percent in
1981, while it had doubled by 2004 (Atkinson et al. 2011).
Income inequality in France between 1945 and 1967 rose with the share owned
by the top 10 percent increasing from 30 to 37 percent approximately (Piketty,
2014). It then faced a consistent decrease until 1983, with the top decile share go-
ing back to 30 percent, finally increasing again, with the top decile share reaching
33 percent in the period 2000-2010.
Inequality tends to evolve procyclically, as during booms the share of profits
tend to increase and top wages usually increase more than bottom and middle
wages. In France, the purchasing power of the minimum wage increased by more
than 130 percent between 1968 and 1983, resulting in a reduction of wage inequal-
ities, as the mean wage increased by only about 50 percent in the same period. In
1982-1983 the government turned toward austerity and no more annual boosts of
the minimum wage were undertaken. Wage inequalities increased, as did income
inequalities. Top wages increased considerably.
To make another example, United States became more inegalitarian than
France and more in general Europe, even if it was a more egalitarian country
at the beginning of the twentieth century. US inequality is now as “bad” as in
Europe in 1900. Income inequality increased during the 1920s, reaching its peak
in 1929, with the top decile getting more than 50 percent of total income. In the
following period, with the Great Depression and WWII the trend in the evolution
of income inequality was reversed, and inequality decreased substantially, even
if less than in Europe. Between 1950 and 1980 the top decile got 30-35 percent
of total income, so inequality was relatively low. The eighties opened the doors
for the explosion of inequality in the United States. The fraction of national
income going to the top 10 percent increased from 30-35 percent in the 1970s
to 45-50 percent in the 2000s. Furthermore, this increase in the top 10 percent
share is likely underestimated because of tax evasion. The upper decile reached
and slightly overcame 50 percent in 2008 and again in the early 2010s.
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This increase is partly due to capital gains which were especially very high dur-
ing the Internet bubble in 2000 and 2007, but Piketty, in his analysis, shows that
excluding capital gains, the same evolution of income inequality in US emerges,
with the top decile rising from 32 percent in the 1970s to 46 percent in 2010.
With inequality being procyclical, after the stock market crash, inequality grew
more slowly as in the years 2008-2009 there were not many profits to be taken on
the stock market. The long run trend did however not change (Piketty, 2014).
Interestingly, even inside this top decile, the 15 percent increase in national
income going to it was not divided equally. In fact, 11 points of this increase went
to the top 1 percent, of which half went to the top 0.1 percent. In particular,
the increase in wage inequalities and the emergence of “supersalaries” were at
the bottom of the increase in income inequality. Furthermore, one third of the
increase in income inequality in the US since the 1980s is ascribed to growing
capital income inequality.
Table 2: Inequality of total income (labor and capital) across time and space
(Piketty 2014, p. 249)
Table 2 gives some examples of societies characterized by different degrees of
total income inequality. Scandinavian countries in the 1970s and 1980s are the
ones with the lowest level of inequality observed in the last one hundred years.
Europe in 2010 is characterized by a situation of medium inequality, while the US
in 2010 together with European societies in 1910 are considered as high-inequality
countries. Furthermore, in Piketty’s possible scenario in 2030, if the development
of inequalities will follow the same path of the last decades, the US could become
even more unequal, with the upper class claiming 60 percent of total national
income and the bottom 50 percent getting only a share of 15 percent of total
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income.
2.3.1 Capital income
Income from capital includes all income derived from the ownership of capital,
i.e. rents, dividends, interests, royalties, profits, capital gains, etc.
Bengtsson and Waldenstro¨m (2015), using an historical cross-country dataset
on capital shares in 19 countries and data from the World Wealth and Income
Database, find a very steep decrease in the capital share in income at the end of
WWI for most countries in their analysis. Furthermore, they find a decreasing
capital share in the 1950s-1970s in most countries and a reverted trend after
1980, supporting also Piketty’s account of the long-run trends in the capital-
labor income distribution. In Figure 3 capital shares in income for advanced
countries since 1975 are reported (Piketty, 2014). Capital income is 15-25 percent
of national income in the 1970s, whereas it is between 25 and 30 percent in 2000-
2010.
Figure 3: The capital share in rich countries, 1975-2010. Piketty (2014), p. 222
The decline of top capital incomes was the main driving force of the falls in
top income shares in the beginning of the twentieth century in most advanced
countries. For instance, in the period between 1916 and 1939, 50 percent of US
top 1 percent income was constituted by capital income, while between 1987 and
2010 the share fell to a third (Piketty and Saez, 2006). An analogous evolution
can be found in the UK, where the share of capital income in the top 1 percent
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income fell from 60 percent in 1937 to under 20 percent by the end of the twentieth
century (Atkinson, 2007).
One has, however, to be cautious in comparing these figures, as these studies
rely on tax data. While it was previously common in France and in the UK
to impute rents to homeowners in the income tax base, these imputations are
excluded nowadays. As mentioned in the methodological chapter, some elements
of capital income, such as interest income or returns on pension funds, are in
many cases either taxed separately at flat rates or exempted. For these reasons,
the share of capital income that is included in income tax returns has decreased
over time (Atkinson et al., 2011). Furthermore, such excluded capital income is
generally earned disproportionally by top income groups, such that this exclusion
leads to an underestimation of top income shares (Atkinson et al., 2011).
In the case of France, the huge destructions over the period going from 1914
to 1945 implied that capital incomes were not able to recover from the shocks,
also due to progressive income and inheritance taxation introduced in the sub-
sequent period (Atkinson et al., 2011). Indeed, progressive taxation hinder the
re-accumulation of large wealth, resulting in more equal distribution of capital
income.
A similar analysis has been carried out by Moriguchi and Saez (2006) for
Japan. Capital income fell dramatically during the Second World War, and the
more recent surge of top incomes was mainly due to the rise of top earnings.
For the case of Italy, there was only a modest increase in the share of the top 1
percent, from 7 percent around 1975 to 9 percent in 2004 (Alvaredo ad Pisano,
2010). The data show that the share of capital income halved in the period,
while the role of wage income increased. However, in the Nordic countries capital
income still plays a crucial role, as explained in Roine and Waldenstro¨m (2010)
for Sweden. For Finland, Ja¨ntti et al.(2010) report that the main driving factor
for the rise of the top 1 percent since the mid 1990s is a huge increase in the
fraction of capital income. Also in the UK, after the fall of capital income in the
first three-quarters of the twentieth century, there has been a partial restoration
of capital incomes since the end of the 1970s (Atkinson et al., 2011).
Piketty and Zucman (2014) estimates show that, while new savings explain
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the largest part (72 %) of national wealth accumulation in the US between 1970
and 2010, the residual part (28 %) is explained by capital gains. They also
estimate that, on average, about 40 % of the rise in the capital-income ratio since
the 1970s is due to capital gains.
Inequality of income from capital may be a powerful multiplier of inequality
if individuals with large wealth manage to obtain higher returns from their for-
tunes. For Piketty (2014) this is a plausible scenario for several reasons. First,
wealthy people have the possibility to employ wealth management consultants
and financial advisors, in order to identify the best investments to undertake.
Moreover, it is easier to take risks and to be patient if you have a large reserve
than if you own almost nothing. These mechanisms could also explain why the
largest fortunes have grown at very high rates in the last decades, significantly
higher than the average growth rate of wealth.
The rise of finance since the 1970s-1980s gave the possibility to achieve higher
returns from capital ownership and, thus, a faster rate of capital accumulation
(Franzini and Pianta, 2016). The banking regulations introduced after the Great
Depression became less and less stringent, free international movements of capital
were allowed, and the introduction of new financial activities resulted in a huge
potential for growing asset values and short-term speculations. The rise of top
incomes is, in fact, not only due to higher compensations, but also due to larger
profits and capital gains from financial and real estate assets. In fact, about half
of the income of the top 1 percent constitutes non-labor income, while for the
top 10 percent, 30 percent of the income is capital income (Dabla-Norris et al.,
2015).
2.3.2 Labor income
Income from labor generally accounts for two-thirds or three-quarters of national
income (Piketty, 2014). The distribution of income from labor takes quite dif-
ferent forms depending on the country, suggesting that national differences and
policies may have a central role in shaping the living conditions of the population
of a country. This section first analyzes the evolution of the labor share in the
main advanced countries, and it then looks at the inequalities in the distribution
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of labor income.
The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2015) reports data about the
dynamics of labor shares in advanced countries. As late as in 1991 the labor
share of total national income was between 59 % in France and Australia and 66
% in UK and Japan, while in 2013 it fell below 60 % everywhere except in UK,
and it shrinked to 55 % in Italy and Australia. In particular, the labor share in
Spain fell from 57 to 48 % between 1991 and 2013, experiencing a loss of 7 %
after 2009. ILO finds the falling labor share being the result of greater profits
within industries, especially for what concerns financial services and medium-high
technology, more than representing a shift in the sectoral composition towards
more capital-intensive sectors.
While the stability of the labor share of income is usually a key foundation
in macroeconomic models 5, these empirical evidences show the opposite. Also
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) document a declining labor income share since
the 1980s, this time attributed to firms shifting away from labor toward capital
due to efficiency gains in capital-producing sectors, often coming along with ad-
vances in computer and information technology. In their analysis, the labor share
is computed using a data set of 59 countries in at least 15 years between 1975
and 2012 created by the authors combining country-specific data with sector-level
national income accounting data from multilateral organizations. They focus on
the labor share within the corporate sector. Out of the 59 countries in the data
set, 42 showed a downward trend in their labor shares.
Figure 4 shows the estimated decline in the labor shares in countries included
in their dataset, in particular in most major economies in the world. Trend
coefficients are reported in units per 10 years, meaning that a value of -5, for
example, indicates a 5 percentage point decline every 10 years.
Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), using time-series cross-section data at the
industry level, find that financialization, indicating an increase of the size and im-
portance of a country’s financial sector relative to its overall economy, could be
responsible for more than half of the decline in labor’s share of income. They also
5Cobb-Douglas functions used in Solow (1957) and many macroeconomic models after that
assumes the stability of the factor shares. This is also true in Kaldor (1961). More on this in
the theoretical chapter.
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Figure 4: Estimated trends in country labor shares (Karabarbounis and Neiman
2014, p. 73)
find that financialization could be responsible for 9.6 % of the growth in officers’
share of compensation, and 10.2% of the growth in earnings dispersion between
1970 and 2008. An increasing focus on the generation of earnings through finan-
cial channels, separated the generation of surplus from production, strengthening
managers’ bargaining power.
Conventional explanations are usually deunionization, globalization, and tech-
nological change. The decline in unionization and other labor market institu-
tions is one of the explaining factors for the observed income dynamics studied
by economists. Kristal (2010) finds evidence for a positive association between
union density and labor share of national income among developed countries.
Globalization, with global flows of capital, goods, and labor, would reduce the
bargaining power of low-skilled workers in high-wage countries. In the techno-
logical change explanation, the spread of information technology since the 1980s
increased the output of physical capital and the demand for skilled workers, lead-
ing to technology-driven changes in marginal productivity. This theory, however,
fails to explain why the fall in the labor share is larger in Europe than in the US.
More on these explaining factors in the next chapters.
Figure 5 shows how the top decile, starting from high levels at the beginning of
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the twentieth century, decreased its share of income after the two World Wars in
all countries until the 1970s or 1980s, when it then started to rise rapidly again to
high levels. From this graph one can appreciate that, even if the increase has been
pronounced also in Sweden, there are big differences between the Scandinavian
country and the United States. The top decile in the US gained an increasing
income share in the last decades, reaching and almost overcoming in 2010 pre-
war levels. This is explained in Piketty as due to the rise of the supermanagers,
meaning the huge increase in compensations to the top management of firms.
This new category of extremely high labor income earners is a phenomenon that
is emerging in the last two or three decades.
In past decades, individuals belonging to the richest part of the population
mostly earned their income from capital and rents. In the last thirty years the
labor income of the very rich appears to have increased with the extremely high
salaries earned by top managers and professionals in sport and show business
(Atkinson et al., 2011). This phenomenon seems to define a sort of “winner takes
it all” economy (Frank and Cook, 1995), in which few highly skilled individuals
can cover a large part of the demand. This theory comes from Rosen (1981),
for which the expansion of scale associated with globalization and with increased
communication opportunities, also thanks to recent IT developments, has raised
the rents of those with the very highest abilities.
However, the evidence about skill-biased technical change being the cause
of rising wage inequality is weak (Card and Di Nardo, 2002) and, as argued in
Piketty (2014), there is a widespread practice among managers in corporations
to set their own pay, which tends to overestimate their skills and performance.
This is possible because of the power that top managers have inside firms.
Strikingly, among the top 350 US firms, the ratio of compensation given to
managers to that of the average employee rose from 30 to 1 in 1978 to 296 to 1 in
2013. To appreciate how big this difference is, one can note that the US President
earns only 25 times the wage of the worst paid federal employee (Mishel and Davis,
2014).
This is a factor that depresses the picture even more: not only the labor
share in national income is decreasing, but this labor share is also earned to an
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increasing extent by the wealthiest part of the population.
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of top deciles income shares for different coun-
tries in the period 1900-2010 6. We can see that European countries have had
a less extreme development of inequalities with respect to United States. While
European countries started from a highly concentrated labor share in the hands
of the top decile, with a share of around 45% going to this part of the population,
they have not reached these levels again yet, even if the rise since the 1980s has
been impressive. United States started with a share of 40% of national income
going to the top 10%, and it has now overcome pre-wars levels, reaching almost
50%.
Figure 5: Top decile income share in US and Europe, 1900-2010 (Piketty 2014,
p. 323)
The two main phenomena that have been at work in recent decades are the
increase in the wage gap between college graduates and those who stop their edu-
cational career at high school (Goldin and Katz, 2008), together with the take-off
of the remuneration to the top 1 percent, as mentioned before. Piketty (2014)
estimates that this second phenomenon, in particular the increase in compensa-
tions for the top centile, explains almost three-quarters of the increase in the top
decile’s share of US national income since 1970.
Table 3 is useful to compare different examples of labor income inequali-
ties. The relatively most egalitarian societies are again Scandinavian countries
6Since labor income corresponds to three-quarters of total income, this picture is represen-
tative of the evolution of labor income distribution.
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Table 3: Inequality of labor income across time and space (Piketty 2014, p. 247)
in the 1970s and 1980s, as for capital income, while the least egalitarian is US in
2010. Piketty (2014) finds that in the most egalitarian societies the distribution
is roughly as follows for the population: the 10 percent receiving the highest in-
comes from labor claim a little more than 20 percent of the total income from
labor; the least well paid 50 percent get about 35 percent of the total; and the 40
percent in the middle receive roughly 45 percent of the total income from labor.
For the US, in 2010 the situation is quite different, with the top 10 percent claim-
ing around 35 percent of total labor income, the middle 40 percent claiming 40
percent, and the bottom 50 percent of the distribution receiving only 25 percent
of the total.
The divergence among developed countries is surprising for mainstream eco-
nomics, as technological change has been the same more or less everywhere: in
particular, the revolution in information technology has affected Japan, Ger-
many, France, Sweden, and Denmark as much as the United States, Britain, and
Canada. Furthermore, growth in GDP per capita has been quite similar in the
countries considered in the last decades (Piketty, 2014). The theory of marginal
productivity and of the race between technology and education does therefore
not seem able to explain these phenomena. This theory builds on the assumption
that a worker’s wage is equal to its marginal productivity, which depends on his
skills and on the supply and demand of these skills in the labor market. The
more a skill is required, and the less it’s available, the higher the remuneration
given to workers having that skill, with respect to ordinary workers, the higher
the wage inequality. When technological progress occurs, demand of particular
skills increases. Workers whose training and skills are not sufficiently advanced
will earn less and wage inequality will increase.
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The educational system must be able to supply with updated skills to an in-
creasing number of workers in order to avoid increasing inequality. Goldin and
Katz (2008) claim that increasing inequality in the US is due to insufficient in-
vestments in education, such that people didn’t receive a proper training, also due
to high tuition costs. Following this reasoning, the best way to prevent increasing
wage inequality would be to invest in education, as also Piketty suggests in his
book. This theory, however, fails to explain why wage inequality is different in
different countries. Even if many advanced countries are very similar in terms of
technological development, inequality may indeed differ a lot. This suggest that
other mechanisms have to be taken into account.
Institutions and rules in the labor market are other factors that may play
an important role. As a striking example, the minimum wage in the United
States, in terms of purchasing power, reached its maximum of 1.60 dollars an
hour (10.10 dollars in 2013 dollars, taking into account inflation) in 1969, with
the unemployment rate being lower than 4 percent at that time (Piketty, 2014).
The purchasing power given by the minimum wage then decreased under Reagan
and Bush in the eighties, rose under the presidency of Clinton, was constant
under Bush and has been increased several times by Obama. Income inequality
at the bottom has closely followed this evolution of the minimum wage, while top
income inequality, as for example the share of wages going to the top 10 percent,
has continuously risen.
Kristal and Cohen (2016) find evidence for the fact that the decline of union-
ization and of the real minimum wage are responsible for 50 - 60% of the increase
in the US wage inequality in the period 1969-2012. Jaumotte and Buitron (2015)
find that the erosion of labor market institutions is associated with growing in-
come inequality, as also Dosi et al. (2016) find. The decline in unionization is
correlated to the rise in top income shares and less redistribution, whereas the
decrease in minimum wages is associated with increases in inequality. They also
find a correlation between financial deregulation and higher inequality and lower
top marginal tax rates and higher inequality.
The marginalistic theory is not even able to take into account the explosion
of top incomes. The rise of top incomes is a phenomenon that mainly occurred
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in Great Britain, US, Canada and Australia. It thus cannot be explained by the
theory of technology and education but must be due to some other institutional
factors.
Piketty in his book presents a theory of why this explosion occurred, especially
in the United States. Speaking about marginal productivity of top managers
gives not much sense to the discussion, since every time the tasks performed are
different and unique. Salaries are usually set by their superiors or at the very
highest levels by themselves. Since the contribution of each manager’s work to
the firm’s output is a vague concept and almost impossible to estimate, this wage-
setting process becomes arbitrary and heavily depends on the bargaining power
of the individuals involved. So, in the limits of corporate governance rules in the
society, executives tend to be generous in setting their own compensations, or at
least optimistic in estimating their marginal productivity.
Social norms and acceptability become also important. A very high remu-
neration is more shocking in France than in US for example. Incentives of top
executives to set higher pays with respect to the past were promoted by the very
large decrease in the top marginal income tax rate in Anglo-Saxon countries in
the 1980s. This cut led to the explosion of top incomes, which in turns increased
significantly top managers’ influence in political decisions and in tax setting it-
self, having an interest in keeping top tax rates low or even decreasing them
further. Having the possibility to finance political parties and pressure groups
may increase the top’s political power significantly.
Furthermore, another interesting aspect of labor income inequality is the de-
gree of intergenerational income mobility in a country. The International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF, 2014) reports that intergenerational earnings mobility, defined
as the elasticity between a parent’s and child’s earnings, is lower in countries with
higher income inequality, such as US, UK and Italy, while it is much higher in
the more egalitarian Scandinavian countries. In the former group of countries,
about 50 percent of any economic advantage that a father has is passed to his
child, while for the latter countries the transmitted advantages are only 20 per-
cent. This correlation between inequality and intergenerational mobility is called
the “Great Gatsby Curve” (Krueger, 2012), and it is referred in the literature as
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inequality of opportunity.
2.4 Inequality, macroeconomic dynamics and growth
Now that I have analyzed how inequality has evolved over time in its different
components, I will introduce a sample of studies performed by different scholars on
the links between inequality, macroeconomic stability and growth. Starting with
the econometric analysis carried out by Maestri and Roventini (2012), what they
find is a positive correlation between inequality and unemployment in Canada,
Sweden and the US. Most inequality series are, in fact, counter-cyclical, posi-
tively correlated with unemployment. Furthermore they find that consumption
inequality is pro-cyclical in US and UK. This can be explained by the increasing
debt taken up by low-income households, who try to keep constant their level of
consumption during crisis. They also perform some causality tests that suggest
that an increase in inequality may be conducive to recessions. Unemployment
seems also to be granger-caused by inequality.
Atkinson and Morelli (2011) find that while some crises were preceded by
rising inequality, some other were not, and they are in any case cautious about
establishing causality in cases where such a rise took place. However, their anal-
ysis does not investigate whether the level of inequality was relatively higher
before periods of crisis, so they do not exclude this hypothesis. They find more
robust evidence about rising inequality after financial crises, in particular after a
hiatus during the crisis, probably due to a solid welfare state and fiscal policies,
in the three banking crises of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the Nordic coun-
tries (Sweden, Finland and Norway), and in the crises during the same decade in
Japan and Italy.
Kumhof and Rancie`re (2010) point out that in the United States, the Great
Depression, which started in 1929, and the Great Recession, which started in
2007, were both preceded by a sharp increase in income and wealth inequality
and by a rapid rise in debt-to-income ratios among lower and middle income
households. Based on this empirical observations, Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010),
Stiglitz (2012) and Fitoussi (2013) argue that the roots of the recent crisis, which
emerged in the financial sector, lie in a structural change in income distribution
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that has been occurring in the last thirty years. These theories will be presented
in more details in the theoretical chapter. Cynamon and Fazzari (2013) note that
in the same years in which income disparities widened, the American economy
performed reasonably well with sustained consumption spending and an average
annual growth rate of 3.16% between 1981 and 2007; on the contrary, continental
Europe, experienced excess savings and sluggish growth. The reason why in-
creased inequality led to excess savings in some areas, while resulting in excesses
demand in others, lies in the interaction of the trend in income distribution with
institutional differences, in particular the degree of financialisation, and the dif-
ferent policy responses. They claim that the development of financial markets
seems to be a key factor in explaining differences among countries.
Other economists as well argue that increasing inequality is indeed at the root
of the Great Recession. Even if the income share of the top 5% increased from
22% in 1983 to 34% in 2007 (Kumhof and Rancie`re 2010) and the top 1% of the
population in the US doubled its share in national income from around 8% in
the mid-1970s to almost 16% in the early 2000s (Milanovic, 2010), analogously
to the period prior to the 1929 crisis, the US economy performed well in the
years before the crisis, apparently giving no obvious signs about the fact that
something was going wrong. Since the rich usually have a lower propensity to
consume than the poor, one would expect a reduced consumer demand leading to
unemployment and lower growth. Instead, American households increased their
spending relative to income from 81% to 95% (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2013). This
can be explained by the increase in household debt from 48% of GDP in the early
1980s to 100% of GDP before the crisis (Milanovic, 2010). Prior to the crisis,
this relationship between inequality and financial instability was never included
in economic studies, neither was the link between inequality and the risk of crisis
(Galbraith 2012, Atkinson and Morelli 2011). In fact, DSGE models generally
assume that the representative agent always satisfies the transversality condition,
removing any default risk (Goodhart, 2009).
While there seems to be clear evidence about the sustained consumption of
low-income households that occurred prior to the recent crisis, it can also be im-
portant to document how households behave in the aftermath of a crisis. Krueger,
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Mitman and Perri (2016) provide evidence for the importance of household het-
erogeneity for macroeconomic questions, employing the Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics (PSID) dataset for the US in some years before and after the Great
Recession. They find that wealth is a highly concentrated variable and that dif-
ferences in consumption rates across wealth quintiles are significant. For instance,
these differences between the bottom and top quintiles range between 20% and
30%. They conclude that these differences across groups can have an impor-
tant role for the aggregate consumption response to a macroeconomic shock. In
fact, they find that, after the Great Recession, the decline in the growth rate
of consumption expenditures is most pronounced at the bottom of the wealth
distribution, and conclude that the bottom of the distribution is crucial in un-
derstanding macroeconomic dynamics.
We have seen how inequality can affect macroeconomic stability and the emer-
gence of crisis. Turning now to the correlation between inequality and long-run
growth, we will see that the evidence is mixed. The empirical evidence is divided
between those studies that find a positive correlation between the variables, and
more recent studies which find the correlation to be negative.
In the last 30 years, the belief that reducing inequality would be bad for growth
has been dominant. One of the typical arguments in defence of this thesis is that
rich people save more than poor people, such that income concentration leads to
higher savings which in turn may finance higher investments, overall leading to
higher growth. This argument is based on Kaldor’s (1957) hypothesis that the
marginal propensity to save of rich people is higher than that of poor people.
Then if the investment rate is positively related to the saving rate, and growth
is positively related to investment, more unequal economies can be expected to
grow faster. For example, Bourguignon (1981) shows that with a convex saving
function, aggregate output depends on the initial distribution of income, and is
higher the more unequal the society is. Concerning poor countries, Barro (2000)
claim that some degree of inequality allows at least a few individuals to gather
the minimum needed to get educated and to start businesses.
Furthermore, inequality is seen as the result of higher rewards given to those
who perform better, as a natural product of capitalism. In fact, for some scholars,
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inequality would enhance growth because it provides incentives for innovation and
entrepreneurship (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), and attempts to remedy inequality
would reduce those incentives, harming growth.
Using a panel data approach, a study by Forbes (2000) found evidence for the
fact that an increase in inequality tended to raise growth during the subsequent
five-year period. Benerjee and Duflo (2003), in their analysis, claim that changes
in inequality in either direction lower growth in the subsequent five years through
the channel of redistributive policies which according to them hurt growth. I will
in next section analyze more in depth this channel.
The literature on the relationship between inequality and growth also stresses
the importance of initial conditions on the level and growth of per capita income
(Durlauf and Quah, 1999). In line with this, Benhabib (2003) detected a nonlinear
relationship between inequality and growth, such that increasing inequality from
low levels would stimulate growth, while an increase past some point of inequality
would engender rent-seeking and lower growth.
The other stream of literature is represented by those studies that find in-
equality to be harmful for growth. Atkinson (2015) states that the hypothesis for
which inequality would help growth is not proven and that there is no general link
identified. Several studies have, in fact, recently found that high inequality may
be destructive to growth, by amplifying the risk of crisis or making it difficult for
the poor to invest in education. One of this is the report by OECD (2015), which
provides evidence for inequality having a negative impact on growth through the
channel of human capital: the wider the income inequality, the lower the chance
that low-income households invest in education, harming growth.
Another example of analysis claiming that inequality is detrimental for growth
is the one carried out by Benabou (1996), who, arrives to this conclusion sum-
marizing a number of papers that deal with the causal effect of inequality on
growth or investment. In fact, the main result from 23 recent studies is that
a one-standard-deviation decrease in inequality raises the annual growth rate of
GDP per capita by 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points.
Also Herzer and Vollmer (2012) find a negative long-run effect of income
inequality on per-capita income for 46 countries, using data over the period 1970-
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1995. Voitchovsky (2005) underlies the importance of the shape of the income
distribution as determinant of economic growth, as inequality at the top end
of the distribution is positively correlated with growth, while inequality at the
bottom of the distribution is negatively correlated with subsequent growth.
Moreover, Berg and Ostry (2011) and Ostry et al. (2014), from the IMF, find
evidence for lower net inequality being robustly correlated with faster and more
durable growth for a given level of redistribution. Income inequality seems to be a
strong predictor of growth duration, more than many variables widely understood
to be central to growth, as good political institutions and increases in human
capital. It is important to point out that these studies analyze correlations, so
that firm statements about causality are hard to make, as Atems and Jones (2015)
argue. For example, there are some cases in history in which extreme equality did
not conduct to strong growth. In their paper, using a panel vector autoregressive
model, they claim that in the medium run, initial inequality has a positive impact
on the level of per capita income; however, the effect turns and stays negative after
some periods. In fact, when they estimate the long-run response of per capita
income to an initial inequality shock, the response is negative and persistent.
Overall, they conclude that increases in income inequality, whatever measure for
inequality they use, leads to lower income per capita.
Also Dabla-Norris et al. (2015), still from the IMF, argue that higher in-
equality lowers growth by preventing lower-income households to stay healthy
and accumulate physical and human capital. Labor productivity can therefore
be lower than in a more egalitarian society, also in line with Stiglitz (2012).
Furthermore, increasing concentration of incomes can reduce aggregate demand,
damaging growth, as the marginal propensity to consume of the wealthy is gener-
ally lower than the one related to middle- and lower-income groups. Furthermore
inequality may dampen investments, and hence growth, by being responsible for
a higher degree of economic, financial and political instability. Inequality could
also lead to policies that may hurt growth, as for example a limited provision
of public goods, together with the fact that growth is less efficient in lowering
poverty in countries characterized by high levels of inequality. Using a panel on
100 countries over the period 1980-2012, they also find that financial globaliza-
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tion, technological progress and an increase in the skill premium are associated
with an increase in the top 10 percent disposable income share.
2.5 Inequality, redistributive policies and growth
Before presenting some studies analyzing the possible links between redistributive
policies and growth, I will briefly discuss how redistributive policies may affect the
income distribution in the first place. Atkinson et al. (2011) summarize the main
channels through which marginal tax rates can affect the earning distribution.
Higher top marginal tax rates can reduce top reported earnings through the
supply side channel, i. e. that workers can work less and earn less; through
the tax-shifting channel, for which top earners may substitute cash compensation
with other forms of non-taxable compensation, as fringe benefits, deferred stock-
option or pension compensation, in order to avoid tax; finally, high top taxes
may lower incentives to extract higher compensation. In many studies 7, there
is evidence for the fact that top marginal tax rates seem to negatively affect top
income shares, but causality is difficult to assess.
Roine and Waldenstro¨m (2010) find that progressive taxation seems to have
been a major contributing factor in the explanation of the evolution of incomes in
Sweden after the two World Wars, preventing the accumulation of new fortunes.
Similarly, Ja¨ntti et al. (2010) claim that in Finland the reduction of income
tax progressivity since the mid-1990s is crucial in explaining the rise of the top
income share in the country. However, Saez and Veall (2005) suggest that in the
case of Canada tax changes cannot be the sole cause, and Canadian top income
changes are more strongly associated with similar changes in the US, suggesting
the presence of international forces, than with the national tax modifications.
Alvaredo (2010) points out that in Portugal, even if tax rates have kept constant
for a certain period, top shares have continued to rise. A possible issue may be
the timing of the impact changes in tax rates may have on top shares, as Atkinson
et al. (2011) note.
Since the early 1980s, the progressivity of the tax systems and the tax bur-
den on businesses has substantially decreased in all major developed countries.
7See Saez (2004), Atkinson and Leigh (2007), Roine, Vlachos and Waldenstro¨m (2009).
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Figure 6: Number of tax brackets and marginal income tax rates for a sample of
European countries and US, 1981-2008 (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2010, p. 5)
Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010) present the results summarized in Figure 6. It can
be noted that both the marginal income tax rates (referring to central govern-
ment rates) and the tax brackets, i.e. the number of divisions at which tax rates
change, have decreased in all countries, suggesting a reduction in the degree of
progressivity in the tax system. This decrease in the marginal income tax rate
has, however, been different in magnitude in the countries considered. While for
France it decreased from 60% in 1981 to 40% in 2008, in the United States it
halved in the period. For Alvaredo et al. (2013) these different patterns in the
decrease of marginal top taxes can be one of the explanations for the evolution
of inequality in the countries. Even if France and US have experienced more or
less the same technological advances, inequality in US has increased much more
than in France in the last decades. Alvaredo et al. (2013) indeed find that there
is a strong negative correlation between the reductions in top tax rates and the
increases in top 1 percent pretax income shares. They also claim that these tax
cuts may have changed the bargaining power and may have induced managers to
increase their remuneration at the expense of enterprise growth and employment.
Redistributive policies effects on growth is a debated topic among scholars. In
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particular, some economists believe redistribution distorts incentives and does not
allow the economy to achieve efficiency, while some others find that redistribution
positively affects growth through reduced income inequality.
Mainstream economics suggests that the significant and widespread reduction
in top tax rates experienced in the last decades enhances incentives to investment
and hence increases employment. Similarly, in neoclassical growth models taxing
capital reduces the return to saving, inducing people to increase consumption and
reduce savings, which lowers investments and growth. In an analogous way, other
policies as minimum wage, labor market regulation, trade and capital restrictions
affect expected profits and induce capital holders to reduce investments (Persson
and Tabellini 1994, Alesina and Rodrik 1994). In this perspective, inequality
may induce the choice to undertake redistributive policies, hence harm growth.
For instance, in these models inequality may harm growth because it may lead
to government intervention. Also subsidies given to low-income households for
orthodox economics would reduce wage disparities, increasing unemployment.
The increase in unemployment would occur because of the lack of downward
wage flexibility implied by this wage compression.
Another economist who advocated a negative effect of redistributive policies
on growth is Okun (1975), whose theory assumes a trade-off between efficiency
and equity. For this reason, efforts to reduce inequality leads to efficiency “leaks”.
Tanzi and Zee (1997), find some general indication that the relationship between
growth and the level of total taxes or of income taxes is negative but that this
relationship is not robust and is sensitive to model specification.
The other category of studies in the debate about the impact of redistributive
policies on macroeconomic dynamics posits that redistribution has a positive im-
pact on macroeconomic stability and growth. Dosi et al. (2016), reject Okun’s
law, finding that equality and efficiency are highly correlated in their analysis
performed with an agent-based model. A larger fraction of unemployed workers
indeed increases the level of personal income inequality. Furthermore, more un-
equal income distribution and higher unemployment spells both induce a stagnant
evolution of aggregate income. These considerations are confirmed in empirical
studies which find redistributive policies to lead both to the reduction of inequal-
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ities and to the enhancement of growth. In fact, Ostry et al. (2014) identify some
win-win policies that could promote both efficiency and equity, as spending on
public capital or education. Also Benabou (2000,2002) and Bleaney, Gemmell,
Kreller (2001) claim that some categories of public spending as public invest-
ments in infrastructure, health, education, social insurance provision are both
pro-growth and pro-equality. These studies all reject Okun’s law.
While mainstream economists focus on the incentives to invest resulting from
marginal tax cuts, another stream of literature has based its analysis on the fact
that marginal tax reductions induce a shift of the burden of taxation from capital
income to wages, the former accruing in a larger proportion to the richest part
of the population. Atkinson (2015) present some very strong evidences about
the fact that not only tax reductions for the rich have had negative effects on
inequality, but they also failed to sustain investment and growth. Piketty et al.
(2011) find that countries that made large cuts in top tax rates, such as the
United Kingdom or the United States, have not grown significantly faster than
countries that did not, such as Germany or Denmark.
Using several measures of redistribution (marginal tax rates, average tax rates,
social spending), Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find that redistribution is likely to
have a positive impact on growth. Similarly, Perotti (1996) tests whether income
inequality has an impact on the marginal tax rate, and whether the latter affects
growth. His results suggest that while inequality may play no role in setting
the marginal tax rate, higher marginal tax rates will have a positive impact on
growth.
Also Ostry et al. (2014) find that redistribution appears to have positive ef-
fects on growth. Only for extreme levels of redistribution there is some evidence
that it may have direct negative effects on growth. In particular, when redistri-
bution is already high (above the 75th percentile), there is evidence that a further
increase in redistributive policies may be harmful to growth, whereas when it is
below that level, there is no evidence for any effect on growth. Overall, redistri-
bution has a pro-growth effect, counting both for potential negative direct effects
and positive effects of resulting lower inequality. Moreover, for very large redis-
tributions they find that the point estimate related to the effect of redistribution
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on growth is larger in absolute value than the estimated effect of inequality on
growth, but the difference is not statistically significant. So even for large levels
of redistribution the evidence is weak. The data tend therefore to reject Okun’s
assumption that there is a trade-off between redistribution and growth.
Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) suggest that fiscal policy plays a critical role in
ensuring macrofinancial stability and can thus help prevent or minimize crises
that disproportionately hurt the disadvantaged part of the population. At the
same time, fiscal redistribution can help raise the income share of the poor and
middle class, and thus support growth. Also Stiglitz (2009) claims that “when the
economy gets weaker, spending on social protection and unemployment schemes
should automatically go up, helping to stabilize the economy. However, at least
in the United States and some other countries, one of the sad facts of the so-
called reforms in recent decades is that we have been weakening these important
automatic stabilizers.” (Stiglitz, 2009, p. 4).
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3 Theoretical background
In this section I will summarize the main theoretical standpoints about inequal-
ity and distribution of income encountered in the history of economic thought.
Following the classification of theories presented by Kaldor (1955), one can dis-
tinguish among four main schools of thought: the Ricardian or Classical The-
ory, the Marxian, the Neo-Classical or Marginalist Theory and the Keynesian
and Post-Keynesian. At the end of the section, I will also present some more
recent neoclassical models, which identify some attempts made by mainstream
economics to include distributional issues in macroeconomic analysis. Finally, in
Section 3.3, Piketty’s standpoint about the theory of distribution is presented,
together with some theories which attempt to explain how inequality may be a
decisive factor for the understanding of the Great Recession.
3.1 Inequality in the history of economic thought
The first considerations about the distribution of income can be traced back to
Malthus and Young at the very end of the eighteenth century, who believed that
welfare assistance to the poor was not justified and that reproduction by the poor
was a severe threat for the overpopulation, leading to chaos and misery. Ricardo
(1810), exponent of the Classical Theory, shared with Malthus and Young this
view of the long-run evolution of the distribution of wealth and class structure
of society. He believed landowners would inevitably claim an increasing share of
output and income. Having no statistics at his disposal, he constructed a theory
based on the scarcity of land: when both output and population grow steadily,
land tends to be relatively more scarce with respect to other goods, such that
its price will continuously rise, following the laws of demand and supply, and
the landlords will get increasingly high rents. The social equilibrium will thus
be upset, since the majority of the population will get a lower and lower share
of total output. The solution he proposed was a steadily increasing tax on land
rents.
As Ricardo couldn’t foresee the importance technological progress and indus-
trial growth would have, his predictions turned out to be wrong. Land rents kept
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high for a period, but the value of farm land then declined considerably relative
to other forms of wealth (Piketty, 2014). Anyway, what can be interesting to
draw from this “scarcity principle” is a reflection on how big increases in prices
of some goods can influence the distribution of wealth and destabilize economic,
social and political systems. More recently one can think about dramatic changes
in the price of oil and real estate as examples of such dynamics. While the usual
laws of supply and demand would imply a lower demand of the good whose price
has increased, this mechanism can take time, and in the meanwhile allow a small
elite, as oil producers, to accumulate wealth.
For Marx (1867) industrial capitalists were the ones who claimed an increasing
share of income. Until the final third of the nineteenth century, workers’ wages
stagnated at very low levels, while the capital share of national income (profits,
land rents, building rents) was increasing in Britain and France (Piketty, 2014).
The capitalists were the owners of industrial capital (machinery, plants, etc.),
which in principle could be accumulated without limit (on the contrary, Ricardo’s
analysis builds upon the limited availability of the amount of land). Marx’s theory
is indeed based on the “principle of infinite accumulation”, i.e. the tendency for
capital to accumulate and be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands with no
natural limit to the process. He believed that the conflict would be either among
capitalists, in the case the rate of return would steadily diminish, or between
capitalists and workers, if capital’s share of national income would continue to
increase. The result would in any case be the end of capitalism.
Even if its prophecy did not realize, as wages increased in the end of the
nineteenth century, what we can learn from his theory is that if the growth rates
of population and productivity are low, the accumulation of wealth becomes
increasingly important and possibly socially destabilizing. In Japan and in the
wealthy countries of Europe, since the 1980s and 1990s, private wealth has indeed
reached very high levels, as reported by Piketty (2014).
For neoclassical economic theory, income distribution was not an issue because
it was determined by the technology. Assuming, for example, a Cobb-Douglas
production function, the marginal productivities of capital and labor determined
respectively the interest rate and the wage, shaping the distribution, with one
50
part of the cake going to profits and capital, and the other part going to labor
and so to workers. The distribution is, thus, determined by technology and there
is no room for public policy.
Another school of thought is the one related to Keynesian and Post-Keynesian
economics. Although Keynes didn’t directly focus on the topic of distribution,
these theories apply Keynes’ apparatus of thought to the problem of distribution.
Keynes recognized that an economy with a highly unequal wealth and income
distribution could create difficulties in maintaining full employment. His motiva-
tion was that the richer people are, the more of their income they save, and there
is a growing gap between consumption and production, together with the fact
that the richer a society grows, the fewer new investment opportunities there are.
In fact, for Keynes savings do not always find an outlet in productive investment,
preventing full employment (Keynes, 1936).
The first remedy Keynes suggested was that the government could increase
its public expenditure taking up loans. With the socialization of investment, the
investment returns would fall. Another possibility would be to achieve the so
called “euthanasia of the rentier”, using monetary policy and lowering the long-
run rate of interest. In fact, the rentiers had for him a parasitic function in the
society, as they didn’t make any sacrifices for obtaining this income, but similarly
to landlords with rents, interests were just a reward for owning a scarce resource.
Another expedient he suggested was a redistribution of wealth and income toward
the part of the population with the highest propensity to consume, the poor.
Keynes justified some degree of inequality, seeing it as an incentive for pro-
ductive activity and as a channel for competitive impulses. However, he thought
that existing inequalities were excessive, and that it would be desirable to reduce
them. His motive for wanting to eliminate excessive inequality and unemploy-
ment was, to a great extent, that he viewed them as threats to capitalism, and
feared revolutionary responses. This problem could be solved enlarging the role
of the government, in his view.
Among Post-Keynesians, Kalecki (1939, 1942, 1954) and Kaldor (1956) con-
tributed to the study of income distribution. For Kalecki the rate of profits of
the capitalist depends on the investment rate, so, given that they have access to
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credit, the more they invest, the more they make profits. As for Kalecki workers’
marginal propensity to save is basically zero, this group just spend what they
earn. Kaldor (1956, p. 96) indeed citing Kalecki writes that “capitalists earn
what they spend, and workers spend what they earn”. In a Kaleckian frame-
work, mark-ups which determine profits, depend on the degree of monopoly, so
they are a function of the degree of competition in the production, in addition
to the cost of raw materials. A combined increase of these two factors reduce
the wage share. Kalecki observed that between 1880 and 1913, the wage share
had not witnessed important changes because of the stability of both the degree
of monopoly and of raw materials’ prices. However, in the period 1913-1935 raw
material prices decreased significantly with respect to wages. Observing no sig-
nificant change in the wage share, Kalecki deduced that the degree of monopoly
must have increased (Kalecki, 1939). In his theory the mark-up is countercycli-
cal, as it increases in recessions, in order to increase profits, and decreases during
booms, as unions become stronger. Raw material prices are determined by de-
mand and are therefore procyclical. These two mechanisms counterbalance each
other, explaining the constancy of the wage share in the short term.
Kaldor’s work implies that the increase in inequality triggers a redistribution
from households with high propensity to consume, the poor, to households with
a lower propensity to consume, the rich, and, similarly, from credit-constrained
households to households without such constraint. The increase of inequality
generates, thus, a chronic deficiency of aggregate demand, and a tendency of
growth to stagnate. Furthermore, while Goodwin (1967) assumed that a higher
wage share leads to lower investment and thus a general economic downturn,
Kalecki (1971) argued that a higher wage share would have an expansionary
effect because the consumption propensity out of wage income is higher than
that out of profit income.
For decades the majority of economists have almost been silent about distri-
butional issues, with the predominance of Kuznets theory and its optimism, for
which inequality would decrease once capitalism had developed to an advanced
phase. A similar optimism can be found in Solow’s 1956 analysis: when the econ-
omy achieves a balanced growth path, all variables grow at the same pace, so that
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every social group benefits from growth to the same degree. This mainly stems
from the Cobb-Douglas assumptions of constant shares of labor and capital in in-
come that, with the Solow model, was transferred directly from microeconomics
to macroeconomics. These reasonings have led to decades of omittance of the
theme of inequality in most research.
3.2 Neoclassical models
Some recent neoclassical models in the literature have tried to take into account
market imperfections, linking them to the study of inequality. I will hereby
present a sample of such models. Two main streams of literature have been in
place in the “modern paradigm”. The first is the capital markets imperfections
approach, introduced by Galor an Zeira (1993), for which in presence of credit
markets imperfections, in sufficiently advanced economies, equality stimulates in-
vestments in human capital for the majority of people and stimulates growth.
Another approach, more political economy-oriented, claims that equality dimin-
ishes the risks for socio-political instability, or for distortionary redistribution,
enhancing investments and growth.
For Galor (2000) the classical approach, which assumes saving rates as in-
creasing function of wealth, and for which inequality therefore channels resources
towards individuals whose marginal propensity to save is higher, increasing ag-
gregate savings and capital accumulation, resembles early stages of economic
development, when physical capital is considered as the prime engine for growth,
while more advanced economies face mechanisms similar to the ones studied in
the credit markets imperfections approach, where human capital accumulation is
a fundamental source of growth.
Another example of model taking into account capital markets imperfections
is the one in Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999). They build a macroeconomic
model in which endogenous and permanent fluctuations in GDP are indeed gen-
erated by imperfections in the capital markets and unequal access to investments.
In presence of decreasing returns with respect to individual capital investments
and credit market imperfections, meaning that individual investments are an in-
creasing function of initial endowments, then inequality concentrates investments
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in the hands of few people and prevents growth. In order to achieve macroeco-
nomic stabilization, a reduction of inequalities may be necessary in this frame-
work. Moreover, in the model, savings are underutilized in recessions because
of limited debt capacity of potential investors. The government should perform
countercyclical fiscal policies, issuing public debt to finance investment subsidies
or cut taxes for investors.
Inequality may also have an influence on short-term output volatility. Heath-
cote and Perri (2015) develop a microfounded dynamic equilibrium model in
which economic fluctuations are driven by fluctuations in household optimism or
pessimism. They use a representative household and a representative firm. The
model predicts that volatility depends on the level of household wealth. When
wealth is high, unemployment expectations doesn’t affect consumer demand, and
the economy is robust to confidence crises. When wealth is low, they argue a
precautionary way of reasoning takes place and unemployment expectations af-
fect more demand, making the economy more vulnerable to confidence-driven
fluctuations. Indeed, from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) for the pe-
riod 1989-2013, they observe that median real net worth since 2007 has halved,
showing no signs of recovery through 2013. In this case, public policies may have
a stabilizing role with respect to consumer demand. They also evaluate some
policies to counterbalance the decline in demand that can fuel a recession, as
a lump-sum unemployment benefit, financed by a tax on workers, which turns
out to reduce the sensitivity of demand to the expected unemployment rate. In
their model, higher government spending, however, turns out to be an uneffective
policy.
Some recent DSGE models allow for some form of agent heterogeneity among
agents building on Krusell and Smith (1998), as for example Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012), where agents are split between patient or impatient agents,
and in Kumhof and Rancie`re (2010) and Kumhof et al. (2015), where agents
are divided between top earners and bottom earners. For example, Kumhof and
Rancie`re (2010) build a theoretical DSGE model linking inequality, household
debt and financial crises. Their analysis is concentrated on how changes in the
income distribution can trigger high leverage and crises. Empirically, they observe
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that the periods 1920–1929 and 1983–2008 both exhibited a large increase in the
income share of the rich, a large increase in leverage for the remainder, and an
eventual financial and real crisis. In their model top earner households (5% of the
income distribution) lend to the bottom ones (95% of the income distribution).
An exogenous inequality shock induces low-income households to increase their
indebtedness, raising their rational willingness to default and the probability of
a financial crisis.
The introduction of two types of agents allow DSGE models to explore new
issues such as inequality. Also financial frictions are introduced in some mod-
els (starting with Bernanke et al., 1999), where borrowers have different access
to the financial markets. Heterogenenity in these cases is, however, given by
pre-determined categories, without accounting for interactions. They apply ad-
justements to the surface of models, without considering deep real implications
(Fagiolo and Roventini, 2016).
Recently, the importance of heterogeneity in the study of macroeconomic dy-
namics has been underlined by Krueger, Mitman and Perri (2016). Extending
the Krusell and Smith (1998) real business cycle model, they find that wealth
inequality can significantly amplify the impact of an aggregate downturn. In
fact, the decline in consumption of the wealth-poor households, as a result of a
shock, imply a larger fall in consumption and output (when it is considered to
be partially demand-driven) than considered in the standard representative agent
version. This is particularly true in the case in which a large fraction of house-
holds with little wealth increase their savings after the shock. Moreover, in this
model, households having high propensity to save, not only save for precautionary
motives, but also for retirement purposes, such that even at high wealth levels
they do not start to decumulate, in line with the empirical findings of De Nardi
(2015). In this way the model, differently from the one in Krusell and Smith, is
able to replicate a distribution of wealth which is similar to the current one in
the US, even if not as skewed at the very top.
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3.3 Piketty and recent theories on inequality and macroe-
conomic dynamics
Only recently the problem of distribution has gained an increasing attention.
Among others, Piketty underlines the political nature of the distribution of wealth
and points out how any determinism in the study of inequality, as the one sug-
gested by Kuznets, should be avoided, since its dynamics cannot be reduced to
purely economic mechanism. In fact, the reduction in inequality that was expe-
rienced by most countries in the period 1910-1950 was mainly a consequence of
war and policies to recover from the shocks connected to it. In the same way, it
was a political shift in the determination of taxation and financial deregulation
which led to rising inequality after 1980 (Piketty, 2014). Views about what is
just and what is not, and the relative economic and political power of actors
have presumably a remarkable weight in shaping the dynamics of inequality over
time.
In Piketty’s analysis, an important role in shaping the mechanisms behind
inequality is played by the power top managers and other people belonging to
the highest percentiles of the income distribution can have in deciding their com-
pensation. This phenomenon is particularly seen in the United States and to
some extent in the United Kingdom. Even more importantly, weak growth and
high returns on capital are two destabilizing and threatening factors to an equal
distribution of wealth over the long run. He theorizes that when the rate of return
on capital is higher than the growth rate of the economy, inherited wealth grows
faster than earned wealth, leading to the accumulation of resources in the hands
of an increasingly smaller part of the population. Furthermore, the saving rate
may increase sharply with wealth, as opposed to what is assumed in standard
models, and the rate of return on capital may be a function of initial capital
endowment, such that people with higher capital endowments are able to gain
more than others from their accumulated wealth. These are typical forces of di-
vergence, which appears to be increasingly common nowadays. Piketty’s point is
that in slowly growing economies, past wealth becomes increasingly important.
Furthermore, if the rate of return on capital is higher than the growth rate for
a period of time, then there is a high risk of divergence in the distribution of
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wealth.
In his view, the rise of the capital share, defined as the share of profits in
income, is the result of the high rate of return to capital and of the increase of
the capital/income ratio. Moreover, the rising capital/income ratio is seen as the
result of a stable propensity to save and a slowdown in income growth due to
stagnating population and slow increases in productivity. When the inequality
r > g is satisfied, where r stands for the average annual rate of return on capital,
including profits, dividends, interest, rents, and other income from capital, ex-
pressed as a percentage of its total value, and g is the growth rate of the economy,
meaning the annual increase in income, inherited wealth grows faster than out-
put and income. Inherited wealth will thus dominate wealth accumulated due to
labor income savings, and the concentration of capital will reach extremely high
levels. Moreover, in Piketty’s framework some reinforcing mechanisms may take
place, as for example a higher average effective return on capital whose owners
have higher capital endowments, together with the “scarcity principle” applied
to real estate or petroleum 8.
For Piketty, when wealth accumulates and concentrates, with the implication
that inheritance ends up mattering more than hard work, the consequence is the
formation of a rentier society more than a meritocratic society.
Some authors, Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010), Stiglitz (2012) and Fitoussi
(2013) , have underlined how this structural change in income and wealth distri-
bution that has been occurring in the last thirty years are at the roots of the recent
crisis, which emerged in the financial sector. In fact, they find in the widespread
increase of inequality the cause of a depressed aggregate demand. Building on
Kaldor’s (1955) framework, when inequality rises, resources are transferred from
low-income households to high-income households, from those who consume al-
most all of their income to those who have a high propensity to save, causing a
reduction in the average propensity to consume. Savings increase and aggregate
demand goes down. Monetary policy reacted by maintaining the level of the
interest rate low. This allowed private debt to increase beyond sustainable lev-
els. In fact, in this framework, growing income disparities force low and middle
8For critics on Piketty’s analysis see Franzini and Pianta (2016), Acemoglu and Robinson
(2015), Jones (2015), Kopczuk (2015).
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income households to enter credit markets so as to find the external resources
that are needed to satisfy consumption needs. Moreover, lower interest rates and
higher house prices allow for relaxed collateral constraints and, therefore, higher
credit availability.
This extremely active borrowing undermines the stability of the system: a
growing number of households defaults on their debt obligations, and, ultimately,
the credit bubble explodes and the structural vulnerability of the economy emerges.
The bubble emerged also due to a continuous search of high-return investments
by those at the top of the income distribution. “Net wealth became overvalued,
and high asset prices gave the false impression that high levels of debt were sus-
tainable. The crisis revealed itself when the bubbles exploded, and net wealth
returned to normal level.”(Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010), p.2). This process led
to a severe tightening of credit conditions, which constituted the main channel
for the transmission of the crisis to the real sector, and with it a generalized
decrease in aggregate demand. For these reasons, their major suspects for the
causes of the crisis are the lax monetary policy preceding it, together with the
deregulation of financial markets and the increase in inequalities that depressed
aggregate demand.
Stiglitz (2012) also explains that monetary policy is used in response to a
lower demand, instead of fiscal policy, for political reasons. Growing inequality
leads to more and more weight to the wealthiests’ influence in political decisions,
as also Piketty argues. This part of the population is usually in favour of a
smaller government and lower fiscal action. So inequality and constraints in the
government’s fiscal space go hand in hand.
Stiglitz (2012) and Rajan (2010) indeed underline the role of political-economy
factors, as the influence of the rich in allowing financial excess to explode on
the eve of a crisis. They claim that the recent crisis was the result of a set of
political and economic pressures that led high-income individuals to save, low-
income people to keep a certain level of consumption through borrowing, and
financial institutions to encourage the process. In this environment, lobbyists
were allowed to push for financial deregulation (Acemoglu, 2011).
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4 Agent-based models, inequality and crises
In this section I will motivate why I choose to use an agent-based model for
the study of inequality, and I will make a survey of previous studies concerning
inequality, indeed in the field of Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE),
a new paradigm proposed by some scholars, as a reaction to new neoclassical
synthesis models, represented mainly by DSGE models. Given the stylized facts
presented in Section 2 and the theoretical hypothesis seen in Section 3, it can be
argued that traditional economic models do not seem to be able to fully explain
the evolution of inequality and its impact on macroeconomic dynamics. It is
therefore interesting to use a new approach, namely the ACE approach, that can
be able to analyze these phenomena.
As a reaction to the recent crisis, several economists realized that orthodox
economics not only didn’t forecast the crisis, but it did not even admit the pos-
sibility of the occurrence of a crisis (Krugman, 2011). Furthermore no satisfying
policy advices to recover from the crisis have been proposed since it occurred
(Stiglitz, 2011, 2015). This permitted this relatively new field in economics to
gain increasing attention. Stiglitz (2011) underlines how aggregate demand can
be affected in fundamental ways by the distribution of income. In fact, with
individuals having different marginal propensities to consume, aggregate savings
and consumption rates depend on income distribution. He argues that distri-
butional concerns are crucial in interpreting the recent crisis. In fact, growing
inequality would have led to lower consumption but, because of low interest rates
and little regulations, the story was a different one, as already explained in the
previous sections. Therefore, distributional issues should be taken into account
in macroeconomic analysis.
While neoclassical models use the representative agent assumption to obtain
a stable and unique equilibrium, avoiding any aggregation problems, in order to
study inequality, heterogeneity is fundamental. As Fagiolo and Roventini (2016)
point out, the representative agent assumption compresses macroeconomic dy-
namics into microeconomics. Kirman (1992) presents some convincing arguments
about why the use of a representative agent is not appropriate for the study of
macroeconomic dynamics. One of these is that, even if we assume that individu-
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als are well-behaved and utility maximizers, their interactions may not produce
a well-behaved maximizing representative agent. Moreover, the reactions of the
representative agent to exogenous shocks, may not correspond to how individuals
would respond. Finally, the representative individual’s preferences may be the
opposite of the society’s preference as a whole.
The representative-agent assumption, thus, does not make neoclassical models
able to account for distributional issues. If the agent looses in terms of reduced
wage, for example, the same agent get additional resources in terms of profits.
In agent-based models, instead, the economy is considered as a complex evolving
system with heterogeneous agents whose interactions shape the dynamics of the
system. The result is the emergence of macroeconomic dynamics by microint-
eractions, with heterogenity having a crucial role in the analysis. As this thesis
primarily deals with inequality and its impact on macroeconomic dynamics, tak-
ing into account agents with different characteristics, such as income and wealth,
seems a natural way of proceeding.
Furthermore, I would like to study the interaction between inequality and
fiscal policies. Policies may have different effects on the performance of the econ-
omy, depending on which “social class” they are addressed to. Stiglitz (2011),
for example, points out that tax cuts for the rich have lower multipliers than
unemployment benefits. These considerations come from Keynes, Kaldor and
more in general the Post-Keynesian school of thought, which considers marginal
propensities to consume which are decreasing in income. The representative agent
assumption does not allow to take these aspects into account. Moreover, in DSGE
models the effects of both fiscal and monetary policies are time invariant. On the
contrary, recent empirical evidence has found that the impact of policies can be
different according to non-linearities in the economic system, and so very different
for example in times of recession compared to periods of boom. Following this
literature, both the state of the economy (see e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko,
2012) and the state of financial markets (Mittnik and Semmler, 2013; Ferraresi
et al., 2014) matter. As my analysis also deals with fiscal policies, this varying
impact which depends on the state of the economy can be important, and it can
be taken into account in an agent-based model. All in all, DSGE models can
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perform well in “normal” times, but they are not able to take into account crises
and deep recessions (Stiglitz, 2015).
Before presenting a survey of studies on inequality with agent-based model-
ing, I will hereby summarize the main ingredients of AB models, presented in
detail in Fagiolo and Roventini (2016). One of AB models’ key ingredients is
the bottom-up perspective, meaning that aggregate properties are obtained as
emergent dynamics given by interactions, which are usually non-linear, at the
micro level. As previously mentioned, heterogeneity is a driver of such interac-
tions. Furthermore, the economy is considered as an evolving complex system,
such that interactions among agents repeated in time determine aggregate prop-
erties. Interactions among agents are direct and decisions depend on past choices
made by other agents, with adaptive expectations. Agents are supposed to be
boundedly rational, as opposed to hyper-rationality assumptions used in DSGE
models. Agents are able to learn by previous behaviors and the evolution of the
state of the system is path-dependent. Novelties are introduced in the system,
which generate new patterns of behavior, with agents facing true uncertainty.
Finally, selection shape market mechanisms.
The above-mentioned characteristics of agent-based models make them par-
ticularly suited to study inequality and fiscal policies. First of all, the possibility
to assign agents heterogeneous income shares and the fact that agents can be
given different marginal propensities to consume, is crucial in this context. This
permits to analyze distributive issues and their effects on macroeconomic dynam-
ics together with the effects of stimulative redistributive policies. Secondly, the
fact that interactions among agents generate endogenous dynamics, that con-
tinuously shape the economy, can make the analysis richer, with respect to an
analysis based on a static economy, which only dynamics stem from exogenous
shocks. Moreover, what is interesting is that agents are not utility maximizing
agents, which seems quite an unrealistic assumption, but they follow simple rules
based on the limited information they have about the economy.
Agent-based modeling permits a very detailed description of the economy
under study and can, thus, represent in a more realistic way, with respect to
standard models, modern economies. The great flexibility of these models permits
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to perform experiments about different inequality scenarios and policy mixes,
observing in each case how the economy evolves. In this way, fiscal policies
can be evaluated and compared in different scenarios, characterized by different
institutional settings. Moreover, since policies may affect the economy in different
ways depending on which part of the population they are directed to, as pointed
out by Stiglitz (2011), it is important to take into account heterogeneity. This
is possible with the use of computer simulations, without the need of a complex
solvable mathematical apparatus. In general, since the real world is continuously
characterized by out of equilibrium dynamics, in which inequality can play an
important role, agent-based models can be particularly suited to incorporate all
these issues.
As opposed to neoclassical economics in which micro-foundation consists in
assuming that the aggregate behavior is given by the single agent’s behavior on
a larger scale, in this framework the emergence of properties on the aggregate is
more than given by just the sum of its parts. The emergence of complex properties
stems from repeated interactions among simple entities (Kirman, 1998). I believe
this aspect is crucial in understanding macroeconomic dynamics.
4.1 ABM survey
After the Great Recession an increasing number of ABM have been presented, as
policy makers appear to be more willing to believe in results and recommendations
obtained by detailed simulation models, with an observable economic structure,
instead of relying on a complex mathematical basis as in DSGE models. I will
hereby present a sample of these models trying to explain possible causes of the
evolution of inequalities, the effects of inequality on macroeconomic dynamics
and, finally, the role public policies can have in this framework.
Some papers detect the role institutions have in shaping the evolution of in-
equality. Isaac (2014) challenges the validity of the overlapping generation model
in Blinder (1973), which predicts that family institutions, such as marriage and
inheritance, can sustain wealth inequality but not cause it. This model assumes
fixed sex ratios in family composition. These predictions discourage attention
to family institutions in explaining the dynamics of wealth inequality. Just by
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changing the assumption of stable sex ratios with a random sex composition
of the family, Isaac proves that these predictions are fragile. He considers two
scenarios for what concerns marriage: assortative mating, meaning that the rich-
est male agent marries the richest female and the same for agents lower in the
ordered income list, and random mating. For what concerns inheritance he con-
siders the “male-preference bequests” scenario, which means that if the family
has only one son, he inherits everything, multiple sons inherit everything and split
it equally, and in the absence of a male heir, daughters inherit everything and
split it equally. What the model predicts is that male-preference bequests com-
bined with assortative mating causes the emergence of extreme wealth inequality,
such that bequest and mating practices appear to be important determinants of
economic inequality.
Other institutions which can affect the evolution of inequalities are labor mar-
ket institutions. Caiani, Russo and Gallegati (2016) find that an effective way
to reduce inequalities is a high degree of labor coordination in setting wages. In
fact, in their model, greater downward rigidity of wages seems to stop the trend
of rising inequality which emerges in all scenarios they analyze. Their conclusion
is that recent labor market reforms which aim is a more flexible labor market, and
the progressive weakening of collective bargaining have played an important role
in the resulting polarization of income and wealth, which has been empirically
observed in many advanced countries since the 1980s. Also Dosi et al. find that
labor market structural reforms which reduce workers’ bargaining power increases
both functional income inequality and personal income inequality.
A number of papers in this stream of literature have detected the possible
links between inequality and macroeconomic dynamics. Cardaci (2014) builds an
agent-based model in order to study the effects of inequality on the likelihood of a
crisis and on the stability of the economy. In his model, households compare their
level of consumption to those over them in the income scale and to their behavior
in the past. This assumption is based on some evidence for this behavioural
rule. He finds that as the income share of the top 1% reaches its peak of 46.35%,
low and middle income homeowners lack the internal resources to finance desired
consumption and there is a decline of aggregate demand that starts a trend of
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declining GDP, with the economy entering a recession. After inequality stabilises,
the economy gets back on a growing path. In this model, changes in income
disparities seem to matter more than the level of inequality itself.
Similar results on the effects of different levels of inequality on the perfor-
mance of the economy are also found in Dosi et al. (2013). In their framework,
more unequal societies suffer from more severe business cycles fluctuations, higher
unemployment rates, increasing the likelihood of economic crises. These findings
are confirmed in Dosi et al. (2016), where more unequal income distributions,
together with periods of high unemployment, worsen macroeconomic conditions
and the long run growth of income.
A possible channel through which inequality can affect macroeconomic dy-
namics is given by the credit conditions in the economy. This is investigated in a
number of papers with agent-based models. For example, Cardaci and Saraceno
(2015) present an agent-based macroeconomic model with the aim of showing
how the effects of rising inequality on the performance of the economy are influ-
enced by the institutional setting and the credit conditions. They find that when
there is a low degree of financialisation and banks are less willing to lend, wider
inequalities lead to a drop in aggregate demand and output. On the other hand,
relaxed credit constraints and a higher willingness to lend, result in a positive
effect on growth in the short run, but, at the same time, in greater financial
instability and a debt-driven boom and bust cycle. Also Russo et al. (2015)
investigate the links between increasing inequality and consumer credit in a con-
text of financial fragility. Introducing consumer credit have contrasting effects,
as it boosts aggregate demand, lowering unemployment, but it also accelerates
the system’s tendency to the crisis. If the rich consume relatively less than the
poor, increasing inequality may cause a lack in aggregate demand. This results
in lower investments and higher unemployment. Consumer credit may indeed
counterbalance this effect for a period, but possibly increasing the likelihood of a
crisis because of financial instability. Russo et al. (2015, p. 3) write that “All in
all, there seem to be causal links between rising inequality and the expansion of fi-
nance, and between unsustainable indebtedness and financial crises. There could
be, then, a significant impact of inequality on financial instability and macroe-
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conomics dynamics. This is particularly relevant to understanding the causes of
the current crisis.”. Indeed, they believe that rising inequality could be at the
root of the present crisis, as well as the “bad distribution of income” that was
one of the major causes of the Great Crash of 1929 and of the Great Depression
(Galbraith, 1954).
In Dosi et al. (2015), an heterogeneous banking sector is added to the Dosi et
al. (2013) model, supplying credit to firms. In this case, there are two possible
effects of inequality on macroeconomic dynamics. When firms’ mark-ups are low
9, more firms go bankrupt and this weakens the banking sector, further damaging
the supply of credit. More firms are financially constrained and reduces produc-
tion and investments, leading to increasing unemployment rates. On the other
hand, when firms apply high mark-ups, they do not invest due to a low expected
demand. This leads to high GDP volatility and high unemployment rates.
Many papers with agent-based models investigate the links between public
policies, inequality and macroeconomic dynamics. Dosi et al. (2013) show that
fiscal policies dampen business cycles and unemployment, reducing the probabil-
ity of crises. Moreover, Keynesian fiscal policies, as tax rate and unemployment
benefits, have a positive effect on both long-term growth and the dampening of
economic fluctuations. Interestingly, more unequal the economy is, the larger the
fiscal space and so the greater the effects of fiscal policies.
Also Dosi et al. (2015) analyze the effects of fiscal and monetary policies on
macroeconomic dynamics. They find that the best policy mix to stabilize the
economy is composed by unconstrained counter-cyclical fiscal policies, dampen-
ing business cycles fluctuations, and a dual monetary policy target, including
employment. It is interesting to point out that, in this framework, the effects
of monetary and fiscal policies are more pronounced when the level of inequality
is higher. As a result, also fiscal consolidation policies have a stronger negative
effect, the more unequal the economy is.
Caiani, Russo and Gallegati (2016) using an agent-based model with different
household classes characterized by different average propensities to save and to
9In this model the mark-up denotes the level of inequality in the system. The type of
inequality considered is the functional inequality, meaning how output is shared among the
factors of production, i.e. capital and labor.
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consume, find that progressive taxation lowers income and wealth inequality and
spurs prolonged real economic development. They also find that institutional and
labor market measures aimed at enhancing collective bargaining and at reducing
downward rigidity for low and middle workers, imposing for example a minimum
wage, are effective in fostering economic development.
A progressive tax system counterbalances the increasing inequality providing
poor households with resources to finance their desired consumption also in Car-
daci and Saraceno (2015), who investigate the effects of different policies on the
stabilization of the economy. In their model, this effects given by progressive
taxation result in a boom in GDP followed by a prolonged period of stability, as
the household sector relies less on debt accumulation 10. For this reason, they
believe that it is extremely important to address the problem of inequality at its
roots.
10Any possible distortionary effect of greater progressivity on labour markets or firm invest-
ment decisions are not taken into account.
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5 The model
Given the difficulties encountered in standard economic models in taking into
account real heterogeneity and deep microinteractions, in order to understand the
role inequality has in shaping macroeconomic dynamics, this thesis utilizes and
expands an agent-based model presented by Napoletano, Roventini and Gaffard
(2015).
The original model is characterized by heterogeneous agents, divided between
borrowers and savers, with time-varying financial conditions, and it is aimed at
studying how output evolves and how fiscal multipliers change according to the
state of the credit market. The authors analyze different fiscal policy regimes.
The first one is a deficit-spending rule, in which the government keeps a constant
level of public spending and allows a deficit to emerge. Then, two balanced-budget
rules are introduced, the first one implying an adjusted tax each year such that,
even if the level of government spending is constant, total tax revenues must be
equal to public spending, and the second one in which government spending is
equal to tax revenues. A bankruptcy shock for a small fraction of the population
is introduced. This triggers a series of defaults which increase the non-performing
loan or “bad debt” held by the bank. This reduces the bank’s net worth and,
thus, diminishes the credit supply.
As a consequence, the number of credit-rationed borrowers increases. Ag-
gregate consumption also reduces because a larger fraction of the population is
not able to satisfy their consumption plans. This implies that aggregate output
goes down, and, therefore, household income falls as well (households’ incomes
are defined as a share of total income). This dynamics implies that also savers’
income falls with respect to their consumption, so that some of them could enter
in the pool of borrowers in order to sustain their desired level of consumption.
This leads to a situation in which an increasing number of borrowers becomes
credit rationed. As a result, aggregate income falls even more.
What the authors find is that the deficit-spending fiscal rule allows a better
resilience of the system to the shock, dampening the effect of the shock and
lowering its persistence. They also find that the size of the multipliers is time-
varying and it is related to the evolution of credit rationing. In a situation in
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which a large fraction of households is credit constrained, public expenditure
sustains private consumption on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it repairs
households’ balance sheets, by increasing their wealth and allowing them to return
to normal consumption levels. On the contrary, in presence of the two balanced-
budget rules, GDP persistently falls below the steady-state level. Multipliers are
also lower in these cases.
The research question this thesis would like to answer, using this model, is
how different levels of inequality may affect the macroeconomic dynamics of an
economy. Furthermore, this work analyzes how the complementarity between
fiscal policies and inequality affects the performance of the system in the short-
run, in terms of the evolution of aggregate income and other relevant variables.
To pursue this investigation, the original model is modified in order to adapt
it to this research question. An inequality shock is inserted in the model, as
will be explained in more details in this section. In particular, three different
shocks are introduced, which generate three different distributions of income in
terms of the degree of inequality they represent. Furthermore, in addition to
the direct government consumption policy considered in the original model, this
version of the model includes the possibility to target public expenditure towards
low-income agents, through a subsidy.
In this version of the model, only the deficit-spending fiscal rule is considered.
Moreover, a crucial feature of this version is that, after the inequality shock,
households that become poorer are characterized by a high effective marginal
propensity to consume as they want to maintain the same consumption habits
as before. An additional increase in their income would therefore be totally
spent until they reach their desired level of consumption. Households which, as
a consequence of the inequality shock, are much richer than before spend only a
small fraction of their income and, thus, have a lower effective marginal propensity
to consume.
This is in line with empirical evidence that finds that households with low
income and wealth exhibit a higher marginal propensity to consume than rich
households. For example, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2013) perform an analysis based
on the 2010 Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth, and find that the
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marginal propensity to consume declines sharply with income and wealth, from
around 65% in the lowest percentiles to some 30% for the richest households.
These findings are confirmed also in a recent empirical analysis performed by
Krueger, Mitman and Perri (2016), finding that differences in consumption rates
between the bottom and the top wealth quintiles range between 20% and 30% 11.
One of the main findings of this study is that an inequality shock generates
a dynamics of falling aggregate income as a result of an increase in the number
of credit-constrained households and a fall in aggregate demand. This is present
in every scenario of inequality, with the fall being increasing with the level of
inequality introduced in the economy. Moreover, for a given level of inequality,
the fall is dampened by higher government expenditure. The multipliers found
in this analysis are time-varying and change according to the conditions in the
credit market. Furthermore, multipliers seem to be higher in the case of a lower
inequality shock, for every fiscal intensity parameter.
The introduction of a subsidy targeted to low-income households dampens
the fall in aggregate income in every inequality scenario. Moreover, in every case
analyzed, the subsidy is associated to a higher peak multiplier than the corre-
sponding case without subsidy. In other words, the subsidy is more effective than
direct government expenditure in sustaining aggregate demand and income and
in lowering the fraction of constrained borrowers. In other words, this redistribu-
tive policy works as an automatic stabilizer for the economy, in line with McKay
and Reis (2016), who find that higher transfers to the unemployed and poor are
indeed effective at lowering the volatility of aggregate output.
5.1 Model Setup
In the model there are N heterogeneous agents, owning an amount of wheat,
which is purchased by j mills, using it to produce the consumption good with a
constant returns to scale technology.
Yjt = Ljt (1)
11Consumption rates are measured by computing total consumption expenditures for each
wealth quintile and then dividing it by total disposable income.
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Total output is simply
Yt = Lt (2)
The price the wheat is purchased at is Pl, up to a maximum level of available
wheat Lmax. The firms own zero profits so the price of the consumable good is
P0 = Pl. In this model overall consumption demand determines the level of mills’
output and thus households income.
Each household has a constant desired level of consumption Zi such that if
Zi ≤ Wit, where Wit is households’ i liquid wealth at time t, the household is a
saver and her consumption equal to her desired level. Otherwise, if Zi > Wit, the
household i is a borrower.
In the economy there is a representative bank whose total credit supply is
TSt = kE
B
t (3)
where k > 0 is the credit multiplier and, since we are in an endogenous money
framework (Lavoie, 2003), k > 1. Credit supply depends on the bank’s net worth
at time t, EBt , such that the healthier is the bank from a financial viewpoint, the
higher is the credit supply in the economy, in line with Basel II and Basel III global
regulatory standards (BCBS, 2011). Credit is allocated to agents using a pecking
order depending on Wit/CDit, where credit demand is given by CDit = Zit−Wit.
If total credit demand is higher than total credit supply some borrowers are
partially or totally credit rationed. In the case credit is denied to some agents,
their consumption is equal to their current net liquid wealth. Interest rates on
loans and deposits are respectively
rb = r(1 + µb) (4)
rs = r(1− µs) (5)
where r is the interest rate set by the Central Bank.
Bank liabilities are
LBt = kE
B
t − EBt = (k − 1)EBt (6)
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Bank profits are given by
piBt = r
b
t (kE
B
t )− rs(k − 1)EBt = [rs + k(rb − rs)]EBt (7)
If some households go bankrupt, this negatively affects the supply of credit
since the bank takes the bad debt.
EBt = E
B
t−1 + pi
B
t − ΣNi=1BDit (8)
Bank profits are distributed to the banker if there is no bad debt. Also the
banker faces a tax on profits. No distribution of profits occurs if there is some
bad debt.
There is a proportional tax on income, such that households’ disposable in-
come is given by:
yDit = (1− τ)yit (9)
with i = 1, ..., N and τ > 0 being the tax rate.
Aggregate demand is given by
Yt = ADt = Ct +Gt + pi
B
t (10)
such that it is defined as the sum of households and government consumption,
respectively Ct and Gt, plus the consumption of bankers, pi
B
t , if any.
Households’ marginal propensity to consume is βit = Zi/Wit. In particular, if
βit > 1 the household is a borrower, while if βit ≤ 1 the household is a saver.
It is assumed that consumption loans and remuneration of savings must be
fully repaid at the end of each period.
The law of motion of agents’ wealth is thus
Wit+1 = (1− τ)yt − (1 + rb)(βit − 1)Wit (11)
if the agent is a borrower, and
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Wit+1 = (1− τ)yt + (1 + rs)(1− βit)Wit (12)
if the agent is a saver.
Households go bankrupt if they’re unable to repay their debt, so if:
(1− τ)yit < (1 + rb)(βit − 1)Wit (13)
In terms of consumption levels:
(1− τ)yit < (1 + rb)(Cit −Wit) (14)
If a households goes bankrupt, his wealth is set to zero and the bank gets a
credit loss equal to:
BDit = (1 + rb)(Cit −Wit)− (1− τ)yit (15)
At the beginning of each simulation run the economy is in steady state.
Each household is assigned a share of total household income.
yit = αi(1− τ)Y Ht (16)
where Y Ht is total household income.
The steady-state level of wealth, considering that in absence of credit-rationing
all borrowers are able to satisfy their consumption plans, is
w∗i =
αi(1− τ)Y H∗t
[1− (1 + rb)(1− β∗i )]
(17)
if the agent is a borrower, and
w∗i =
αi(1− τ)Y H∗t
[1− (1 + rs)(1− β∗i )]
(18)
if the agent is a saver.
Aggregate consumption is stable in steady state and each agent consumes a
fraction of total consumption:
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C∗i = γ
∗
iC
∗
i (19)
where ΣNi γ
∗
i = 1.
Furthermore, as C∗i = β
∗
i w
∗
i and C
∗ = (1− τ)Y H∗,
β∗i αi
[1− (1 + rb)(1− β∗i )]
= γ∗i (20)
for a borrower;
β∗i αi
[1− (1 + rs)(1− β∗i )]
= γ∗i (21)
for a saver.
Finally, we can write agents’ marginal propensity to consume in steady state
for borrowers and savers respectively as
β∗i =
γ∗i r
b
[γ∗i rb + (γ
∗
i − αi)]
(22)
β∗i =
γ∗i r
s
[γ∗i rs + (γ
∗
i − αi)]
(23)
For a given distribution of income shares, consumption weights are randomly
assigned to households and values of β∗i are computed, so that the fraction of
borrowers in the population is 0 < η∗ < 1.
5.2 Model modifications
In this version of the model the income shares at t = 1 are randomly drawn
from a uniform distribution, with the conditions of being between 0 and 0.01 for
each agent and their sum being equal to 1. This generates an initial distribution
of income shares which is quite egalitarian. Starting from these conditions in
steady state, a shock to the initial income shares distribution is introduced at
time t = 3. In particular, the shock requires that the distribution is now much
more skewed, as the shares, again drawn from a uniform distribution, must be
between 0 and 0.01 and sum up to 0.6. The remaining 40% of total income
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is then equally assigned to 2 agents at the top of the income distribution. This
inequality shock, which is denoted as medium inequality shock, generates a higher
level of inequality than the one in steady state and the resulting performance of
the economy can be analyzed in detail.
Moreover, simulations are performed introducing also a low inequality shock,
which generates a distribution such that 98% of the population get 80% of total
income and a high inequality shock, in which the bottom 97% of the population
get 40% of total income. These two, together with the medium inequality shock
scenario, are compared.
These three different income distributions are intended to be a representation
of three different degrees of inequality in a society, in the spirit of Piketty’s (2014)
analysis. In particular, these distributions vary significantly in the fraction of
income earned by the lower and middle classes.
Furthermore, different fiscal policy scenarios are considered. In addition to
direct government consumption analyzed also in the original model, in this version
there is also the possibility to introduce a subsidy. In this case, the subsidy is
introduced after the shock. The resources that are distributed as subsidies are
taken from the total sum of taxes collected by the government in the same period.
These taxes are divided and distributed to the part of the population which is
poorest after this inequality shock, i.e. in the medium inequality shock case the
lowest 98% of the income distribution.
yDit = y
D
it + si (24)
where
si =
τY Ht
n− 2 (25)
for i = 1, ..., n− 2.
When the subsidy flag is activated in the code, government expenditures enter
no more in a direct way in aggregate income, but indirectly through increased
consumption by households.
Y st = AD
s
t = Ct + pi
B
t (26)
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5.3 Simulation results
In this analysis, each experiment includes 50 independent Monte-Carlo simula-
tions 12. In each Monte-Carlo repetition, simulations for a series of 6 fiscal inten-
sity parameters, which define government expenditures as percentages of steady
state income, are run. As previously explained, at time t = 3 the economy is
shocked such that the distribution of income shares becomes considerably more
unequal. Tracking the evolution of aggregate income with respect to steady state
income, allows for an analysis of the dynamics and the properties that can emerge
in presence of an inegalitarian income distribution. The analysis starts with the
medium inequality shock. Moreover, a comparison is made between two scenar-
ios for what concerns public expenditures, one in which government consumption
directly enters in aggregate income, and another one in which a subsidy is in-
troduced after the shock, such that government consumption is targeted towards
low-income households.
In this model, the algorithm that determines consumption shares takes as
input income shares. Starting from a quite egalitarian income distribution, this
implies that also initial consumption shares are quite equal. In turn, desired con-
sumption is set to be equal to households initial consumption, such that also this
variable takes similar values for all households. The introduction of an inequality
shock, leads to a situation in which many households find themselves with a lower
income share than in steady state, such that their desired level of consumption,
which is assumed to be constant over time, can now be higher than the resources
at their disposal. In other words, households’ realized marginal propensities to
consume become very high for agents who cannot satisfy their consumption plans,
generally those belonging to the poorest part of the population, which, after the
inequality shock, get a lower income share than before. These mechanisms are
in line with empirical evidence, as previously mentioned 13. This implies that
a great number of households has to take up debt in order to sustain the same
12As pointed out by Fagiolo and Roventini (2016), this method permits to have a distribution
of a given statistics computed on simulated variables. In fact, given the stochastic nature of
the process, each Monte-Carlo run will give a different value of such statistics. By analyzing
how this statistics depends on some initial parameters, one can get descriptive knowledge of
the dynamics in the system.
13This is also in line with the work of Caiani, Russo and Gallegati (2016).
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level of consumption. The pool of borrowers has, thus, now widened. Therefore,
the credit supply may not be sufficient to cover all credit demand, leading to
the exclusion of some potential borrowers from the credit market and to credit
rationing (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990).
For now, let us consider the case in which a medium inequality shock is intro-
duced and government consumption is direct, in the sense that it enters directly
in aggregate income. Performing fifty Monte-Carlo simulations, the model gen-
erates data such that aggregate income as a fraction of steady-state income falls
considerably after the inequality shock, as depicted in Figure 7. When the dis-
tribution becomes more unequal, many households lack the internal resources to
finance desired consumption and there is a decline of aggregate demand that spurs
a trend of plunging aggregate income, with the economy entering a recession, in
line with Dosi et al (2016), Dosi et al. (2013) and Cardaci (2014). The figure also
reports the evolution of aggregate income over time, for different fiscal intensity
parameters, which define government expenditure as a fraction of steady state
income. The smaller this parameter is, the deeper is the downturn, suggesting
that a more active government dampens the negative effects given by the presence
of a highly skewed distribution.
Figure 7: Evolution of aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income. Each
point on the graph is an average of 50 independent Monte-Carlo simulations.
In fact, in case of an unequal distribution of income, higher levels of public
expenditures reduce the differences in aggregate output between the inegalitarian
case and the more egalitarian steady state case. Figure 7 also shows how the
shock leads the economy to a lower steady-state level. This is true for every
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fiscal intensity parameter considered. For example, for 15% fiscal intensity, the
maximum fall of aggregate income leads to a level of 29% of steady-state income,
as reported in Table 4 and it is visible from the graph that, throughout the whole
period, aggregate income is quite constant after the inequality shock, suggesting
that in unequal economies aggregate output stays persistently at lower levels,
compared to the case with a more equal distribution.
Let us now analyze the behavior of fiscal multipliers in this model. They
are calculated as a fraction between the variation in aggregate output between
two scenarios with different fiscal intensities and the variation of government
consumption in these two different cases. The baseline level of fiscal intensity z
is the one in which government consumption corresponds to 1% of steady state
income.
mfrh (t) =
Y frh (t)− Y frz (t)
Gfrh (t)−Gfrz (t)
with h 6= z (27)
This analysis, summarized in Figure 8, shows how fiscal multipliers are state-
dependent and time-varying and are higher for lower levels of aggregate income,
for a given income distribution shock. In fact, when aggregate income reaches
extremely low levels after the inequality shock, active government expenditures
can provide a stimulus to the economy and may, thus, have a stronger impact on
the evolution of aggregate income. In other words, there is a bigger “fiscal space”
in this case, when the crisis is more evident.
All peak fiscal multipliers found in this analysis are, in fact, significantly
higher than one, in line with Auerbach and Gorodnichenko’s (2012) empirical
findings about the high levels of multipliers during recessions. Moreover, it is
visible from Figure 8 how fiscal multipliers constantly stays at levels which are
higher than one, for every fiscal intensity parameter. This is in line with empirical
research showing that multipliers are higher under tight credit market conditions
(Ferraresi et al., 2014). In fact, the degree of credit rationing in the economy, can
help explaining the evolution of fiscal multipliers 14.
14Standard models have not taken the role of fiscal multipliers in macroeconomic dynamics
seriously, since they have underestimated their magnitude (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). This
has led to a poor understanding in the economic discipline of the potential positive effects fiscal
policies could have on the economy. As the other side of the coin, economists and policy-makers
have overseen the destructive consequences fiscal consolidation policies can imply. Dosi et al.
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Figure 8: Evolution of fiscal multipliers with respect to 0.01 fiscal impulse. Each
point on the graph is an average of 50 independent Monte-Carlo simulations.
For this reason, let us analyze the evolution of the fraction of constrained
borrowers after the shock. This large increase in the number of constrained
households, visible in Figure 9, results from the dynamics previously explained,
for which higher inequality widens the pool of potential borrowers, who are un-
able to satisfy their consumption plans relying on their wealth only. Therefore,
credit supply is not sufficient to satisfy credit demand and a higher portion of
borrowers becomes credit constrained. Households which are denied access to
credit consume less than their desired level and, hence, aggregate consumption
falls, implying a fall in aggregate income. These findings are in line with Cardaci
and Saraceno (2015), in which credit constraints together with wider inequalities
generate a fall in aggregate demand and output. Again, government consumption
can dampen these negative effects, and this is why a lower fraction of constrained
borrowers corresponds to a higher fiscal intensity parameter. Moreover, in an
economy with a higher fraction of constrained borrowers, fiscal multipliers are
higher, as an increase in public expenditure increases aggregate output relatively
more, since aggregate consumption is relatively lower.
Some households can also default. In fact, at the end of each period, house-
holds have to pay back their debt with interests. When this amount that has
to be paid back is greater than the resources households have at their disposal,
(2015), with the help of an agent based model, find that austerity policies considerably harm
the economy.
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they go bankrupt. In this case, the bank gets a loss and this decreases the credit
supply in the subsequent period, increasing the degree of credit rationing in the
system. Moreover, bankrupted households’ wealth is set equal to zero, as well as
their consumption, and they are denied access to credit for a given amount of
periods. For this default number of periods households are obliged to consume
less than their desired levels. Hence, this mechanism further depresses aggregate
demand and income. In this analysis the number of households that default is
limited. For example in this case with a medium inequality shock and direct
government consumption, the maximum number of bankruptcies is of 8 out of
1000 households in one period, for the lowest fiscal intensity parameter. However,
as stressed in Napoletano, Roventini and Gaffard (2015), even a small fraction of
bankrupted households can generate a negative spiral of declining consumption
and output. Therefore, this mechanism which emerges as a consequence of the in-
equality shock should be taken into account as a possible additional destabilizing
effect.
Figure 9: Evolution of the average fraction of constrained borrowers. Each point
on the graph is an average of 50 independent Monte-Carlo simulations.
Trying to connect all the links, a summary of the dynamics in the model
explaining this extreme increase in the average fraction of constrained borrowers
and, with it, a downturn in aggregate income is presented. The inequality shock
is introduced as a tool in the model in order to get a skewed distribution, together
with an effective marginal propensity to consume, which is high for households
negatively affected by the shock and low for households which find themselves
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with an income share which is higher than before.
As the model is constructed such that the desired level of consumption de-
pends on initial income, the steady state situation of the more egalitarian income
distribution generates an egalitarian consumption share. Oonce the shock is in-
troduced, many households find themselves with a considerably lower income
share with respect to what they received in steady state.
For a large number of households, this income (and wealth) is not sufficient
in order to attain their desired level of consumption, which is constant over time.
For this reason, households have to ask for credit. As credit is allocated following
a pecking order (Dosi et al. 2013, 2015), that depends on the ratio between a
household’s wealth and his credit demand, the total amount of credit supply may
not be sufficient. Households are, thus, credit-rationed and are forced to consume
less than what they would like to.
Therefore, a negative spiral of reduced disposable income which generates
lower consumption, lower aggregate income and, again, lower households dispos-
able income takes place. Indeed, households disposable income falls because of
lower consumption due to an excess of credit demand with respect to the avail-
able credit supply. As a result, in the next periods, even more households could
be forced to borrow in order to maintain their consumption behavior. Moreover,
indebted agents are obliged to pay back their debt, both principal and interests,
at the end of each period. Hence, even if they get credit in order to finance con-
sumption, their wealth diminishes and could be eaten up by debt, in line with
Koo (2011).
In the case in which a household is not able to repay its debt at the end of
the period, this agent defaults, generating a loss for the bank, which, in turn, de-
creases its credit supply. This mechanism increases the degree of credit rationing
in the economy even more. Moreover, the bankrupted agent is denied the access
to the credit market for a given amount of periods, and its consumption is set
equal to zero when he defaults. For the subsequent periods in which he does not
have access to credit, the bankrupted household is obliged to consume less than
its desired level. This implies a lower aggregate consumption, which depresses
aggregate output further. The government can ensure that the private sector has
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the income to repair its balance sheets, by keeping the GDP from shrinking.
5.4 Simulations with different inequality shocks
This section investigates how different degrees of inequality in households’ income
distribution may affect the resilience of the system to an inequality shock. Three
different inequality shocks have been introduced: a “low inequality shock”, in
which 98% of the population get 80% of total income, a “medium inequality
shock”, which is the one analyzed in detail in the section above, in which the
bottom 98% of the population get 60% of total income, and a “high inequality
shock”, in which the bottom 97% of the population get 40% of total income.
The first variable that can be analyzed is the maximum fall in aggregate in-
come, or minimum aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income, which is
generated by different inequality shocks. As visible from Table 4, when inequality
increases less, as in the “low” scenario, with respect to the two other cases, the fall
in aggregate income is less severe. In fact, for a given fiscal intensity parameter,
the minimum level of income reached as a consequence of the inequality shock is
higher, the higher is the degree of concentration in the income distribution.
As in the medium inequality case, analyzed in detail in the previous section,
for each inequality scenario, the higher is the fiscal intensity, the higher is the
minimum level of aggregate income reached. For this reason, one can conclude
that government spending acts as a parachute against the fall in incomes for
whatever shape of the distribution of income shares.
Table 4: Minimum aggregate income as a fraction of SS income for low, medium
and high inequality
Fiscal intensity Low inequality Medium inequality High inequality
5% 20% 13% 11%
10% 29% 22% 18%
15% 36% 29% 25%
50% 69% 65% 61%
These dynamics can be explained by looking at the average fraction of con-
strained borrowers in the different cases. Let’s compare, for example, the low
inequality shock scenario with the high inequality shock case, since these are
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the two in which biggest differences in the dynamics of aggregate income are ob-
served. Figure 10 clearly shows how the average fraction of constrained borrowers
is higher in the case in which the level of inequality is higher. In fact, in the case
of a highly skewed distribution, the share of income earned by the bottom 97%
of households is of 40%. This means that a large fraction of households has not
enough internal resources at their disposal in order to finance consumption, such
that they have to ask for credit. As credit is allocated using a pecking order rule,
a large fraction of borrowers is credit constrained and, thus, obliged to consume
less than desired.
Moreover, the generated data show that the maximum number of bankrupted
households in one time step for the lowest fiscal intensity is of 7 in case of low
inequality, while it is of 13 in case of high inequality. This implies that the
negative effects generated by bankruptcies for which credit supply diminishes,
as well as aggregate consumption and income, and for which credit rationing
increases further, is more present in the high inequality scenario.
Figure 10: Average fraction of constrained households for 15% fiscal intensity
parameter, low inequality vs. high inequality
Comparing the evolution of multipliers for different inequality scenarios, what
emerges from Table 5 is that a less skewed distribution of income is associated with
higher multipliers. This may look counter-intuitive because higher inequality is
associated with higher aggregate income falls, and thus one would expect a larger
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fiscal space as well. However, for high levels of inequality, the structure of the
distribution of income and the presence of a high fraction of credit constrained
borrowers imply that many agents are not able to repair their balance sheets and,
thus, increase consumption, compared with a low inequality scenario. In fact, as
public expenditure increases aggregate income, most families receive an income
which is not high enough to increase consumption. A high fraction of income
is indeed earned by few rich households, who save their income almost entirely.
This can explain the lower effectiveness of fiscal policies in an environment of
high inequality.
It can be interesting to point out that, as showed in Table 5, when government
expenditure becomes very high (50% of steady state income), fiscal multipliers
are very similar in the three inequality scenarios. In fact, in this case, a very ac-
tive government counterbalances the difficulties in repairing households’ balance
sheets and in increasing consumption which are experienced in a highly unequal
economy, such that fiscal policies are more effective.
Moreover, for a given inequality shock, multipliers are higher for lower fiscal
intensity parameters, suggesting again the presence of a wider fiscal space. This
suggests that, in any case, fiscal policy may have effect in increasing aggregate
income for all three cases, as higher fiscal intensity parameters are associated
with a dampened fall in aggregate income in all inequality scenarios, as visible
from Figures 7 and 11 and Table 4.
Table 5: Peak multipliers with respect to 1% fiscal intensity.
Fiscal intensity Low inequality Medium inequality High inequality
5% 2.47 1.93 1.50
10% 2.10 1.76 1.44
15% 1.88 1.63 1.39
50% 1.21 1.21 1.14
5.5 Simulations with redistributive policy
It can also be interesting to analyze how redistributive policies affect the perfor-
mance of the economy. In this model, a subsidy given to the poorest part of the
population is introduced. In particular, taxes collected are divided by households
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Figure 11: Evolution of aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income for
scenarios with respectively low and high inequality shocks.
belonging to this group. For now let us consider the scenario with a medium
inequality shock. In the next section a comparison between different inequality
regimes will be made.
As a result of the introduction of the subsidy, the economy seems to face
a less severe downturn, confirming empirical findings about positive effects of
redistribution on the evolution of output (Ostry et al., 2014) and theoretical
findings that posit that the introduction of subsidies stabilize macroeconomic
dynamics (Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty, 1999; McKay and Reis, 2016)15. Taking
as an example the case in which the fiscal intensity parameter is equal to 15%,
what emerges from Table 6 is that the minimum aggregate income, measured as
a fraction of steady state income, is of 36%, compared to a minimum income
of 29% in the corresponding scenario without subsidy. In fact, when a subsidy
is introduced after the inequality shock, credit constrained households are able
to increase their consumption and to repair relatively faster their balance sheet,
paying back on their debts.
Moreover, the presence of a subsidy also prevents, to some extent, the fall in
households disposable income and grants a greater resilience to the economy.
The effects of the introduction of a subsidy widely differ depending on the
fiscal intensity parameter. In fact, as emerges from Figure 12, for the highest
value of the parameter, the fall in aggregate income is quite limited and, after
15Similarly, in Dosi et al. (2013) unemployment benefits have a positive effect on dampening
economic fluctuations. Caiani, Russo and Gallegati (2016) find that minimum wages foster
economic development.
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some periods, the subsidy allows the economy to attain a level of aggregate income
which is close to the initial one, given by the more egalitarian distribution of
income. This is because the government has a higher amount of resources at its
disposal to be used for redistributive purposes. Therefore, in this scenario with
50% fiscal intensity, a high government expenditure in the first periods reduces
the fall in aggregate output, and, combined with the introduction of the subsidy
after the inequality shock, it allows the economy to quickly recover from the crisis,
almost fully.
Figure 12: Evolution of aggregate income in the scenario with a subsidy and
medium inequality shock. Each point on the graph is an average of 50 independent
Monte-Carlo simulations.
Table 6: Minimum aggregate income as a fraction of SS income, medium inequal-
ity shock. Direct government expenditure vs. subsidy.
Fiscal intensity Direct government expenditure With subsidy
5% 13% 15%
10% 22% 26%
15% 29% 36%
Table 7: Maximum multiplier with respect to 0.01 fiscal impulse. Medium in-
equality. Direct government expenditure vs. subsidy.
Fiscal intensity Direct government expenditure With subsidy
5% 1.93 2.24
10% 1.76 2.20
15% 1.63 2.12
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Figure 13: Evolution of fiscal multipliers with respect to 0.01 fiscal impulse in
the subsidy scenario, medium inequality shock. Each point on the graph is an
average of 50 independent Monte-Carlo simulations.
Comparing multipliers for the cases with subsidy and with direct public ex-
penditure, it turns out that the multiplier is higher in the first case. Taking again
as example the case with a fiscal intensity of 15 percent, Table 7 shows that the
value of the multiplier is equal to 2.12 with subsidy, while it is equal to 1.63 in
the scenario without this redistributive policy. In other words, the subsidy has
a bigger effect on aggregate income than direct public expenditure. This mir-
rors the phenomenon for which increasing poor households’ disposable income
makes a higher number of agents able to attain their desired level of consump-
tion, increasing aggregate consumption and, thus, aggregate income relatively
more than if these resources were directly summed up to aggregate income. This
higher multiplier effect results in a higher aggregate income, relatively to the sce-
nario without subsidy, which can be distributed to the population and help the
economy recovering, at least partially, from the recession.
To sum up, the introduction of a redistributive policy, such as a subsidy, not
only attenuates the fall in aggregate income due to an inequality shock, func-
tioning as an automatic stabilizer, but it is also more effective than government
consumption.
Figure 14 helps explaining the wide disparities in the evolution of aggregate
income coming along with the introduction of the subsidy. For instance, the
subsidy, together with a high fiscal impulse, allows households belonging to the
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Figure 14: Evolution of the average fraction of constrained borrowers, scenario
with subsidy. Medium inequality shock. Each point on the graph is an average
of 50 independent Monte-Carlo simulations.
lowest deciles of the income distribution to have sufficient resources in order to
satisfy their consumption needs. For this reason, the fraction of the population
who needs credit in order to satisfy their consumption plans is now lower and, in
turn, the fraction of constrained households decreases.
A high fiscal intensity, particularly the highest one of 50%, helps most house-
holds in satisfying their consumption plans, through higher subsidies, and sustains
aggregate consumption. This increases significantly aggregate income. On the
opposite, for what concerns the lowest fiscal intensity of 1%, the available amount
of resources which can be distributed as subsidies is not enough in order to change
poor households’ financial situation. A large fraction of households would like to
consume more than what they are able to with their wealth and, as the bank sup-
plies a limited amount of credit, the fraction of constrained borrowers is extremely
high. The subsidy in this case is not enough in order to repair their balance sheet
and increase considerably their consumption. In fact, as visible from Table 6, the
increase in aggregate income as a consequence of the introduction of a subsidy,
is higher, the higher the fiscal intensity parameter.
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5.6 Simulations with redistribution for different inequal-
ity shocks
Performing simulations in which a subsidy is given to the part of the population
which gets a low income share for different inequality scenarios, what emerges is
that the subsidy limits the fall in aggregate income for each of the three cases
and for each fiscal intensity parameter. Table 8 takes as an example the case in
which the government spends an amount equal to 15% of steady state income.
Comparing for each inequality shock the baseline case of public spending without
subsidy with the case in which a subsidy is introduced, the minimum income
reached after the inequality shock is higher with the subsidy in all three cases.
Moreover, even after the introduction of the subsidy, the minimum aggregate
income is reached in the high inequality case, such that a lower inequality com-
bined with the subsidy is the scenario which limits the fall in aggregate income
the most.
Table 8: Minimum aggregate income as a fraction of SS income for low, medium
and high inequality. Direct government expenditure vs. subsidy. 15% fiscal
intensity.
Inequality shock Direct government expenditure With subsidy
Low 36% 43%
Medium 29% 36%
High 25% 30%
Again, the subsidy allows indebted households to repair their balance sheets.
The result is an increase in aggregate consumption which attenuates the fall
in aggregate income. Figure 15 shows how also for the cases relative to a low
inequality shock and a high inequality shock, the highest fiscal intensity parameter
allows to quickly get to a new steady state which is much higher with respect to
the ones related to the other fiscal intensity parameters.
Moreover, Figure 16 shows how the introduction of a subsidy can drastically
change the evolution of aggregate income, when the fiscal intensity parameter is
high. In particular, it compares the evolution of aggregate income in the two
different government expenditure regimes for the high inequality scenario with
50% fiscal intensity. The subsidy allows the economy to partially recover from
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Figure 15: Evolution of aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income for
scenarios with respectively low and high inequality shocks and with subsidy.
the downturn, and this is due to a fall in the average fraction of constrained
households.
Figure 16: Evolution of aggregate income as a fraction of steady state income in
the high inequality scenario with 50 percent fiscal intensity
Figure 17 tracks the evolution of fiscal multipliers for the scenario with the
inclusion of a subsidy, respectively for low and high inequality shocks. What
emerges from a comparison is that fiscal multipliers are higher when inequality is
lower. This is again connected to the dynamics in the model for which, in pres-
ence of low inequality, more households can gauge from an increase of aggregate
income, such that they can increase consumption.
For what concerns the evolution of the average fraction of credit constrained
households, this is lower for a less skewed distribution of income than fore a more
concentrated one at every time step, as visible from Figure 18. This explains the
fact that a lower level of inequality, together with the introduction of a subsidy, is
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Figure 17: Evolution of fiscal multipliers for 0.15 fiscal intensity with respect to
0.01 fiscal impulse in the scenario with subsidy, low and high inequality shock.
Each point on the graph is an average of 50 independent Monte-Carlo simulations.
associated with a less severe fall in aggregate income, with respect to the scenario
with a high inequality shock, as less households lack the internal resources to
satisfy their consumption plans.
Furthermore, this could help explaining why fiscal multipliers are lower in
the high inequality scenario. In fact, the consumption of credit constrained con-
sumers is bound by their wealth, which is very low in a system characterized
by a highly skewed distribution. By increasing income levels, fiscal expenditure
allows constrained borrowers to repair their balance sheets and to increase their
consumption levels, but relatively less than in the framework with low inequality.
Figure 18: Evolution of average fraction of constrained borrowers in the scenario
with subsidy, low and high inequality shock.
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Interestingly, it can be noticed that, for every inequality scenario, the subsidy
allows a higher fiscal multiplier effect for every given parameter of government
expenditure. This is confirmed in Table 9, in which, as an example, peak mul-
tipliers for 15% fiscal intensity with respect to 1% fiscal intensity are reported.
Comparing the direct government expenditure scenario with the one with the
subsidy, for each inequality shock, the value for the peak multiplier is higher in
the case with the subsidy.
Table 9: Maximum multiplier for 0.15 fiscal intensity parameter with respect to
0.01 fiscal impulse. Direct government expenditure vs. subsidy.
Inequality shock Direct government expenditure With subsidy
Low inequality 1.88 2.24
Medium inequality 1.63 2.12
High inequality 1.39 1.74
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6 Conclusions
In this work, an extension of the analysis carried out by Napoletano, Roventini
and Gaffard (2015) with an agent-based model has been presented. In this version
of the model, the system is characterised by heterogeneous agents in terms of
wealth, income and marginal propensities to consume and by constraints in the
availability of credit. The analysis starts with a situation of very low inequality.
Then, an inequality shock is introduced and the evolution of aggregate income,
fiscal multipliers and average fraction of constrained borrowers is tracked. This
inequality shock has been indicated as a medium inequality shock. The analysis
has been carried out also for two other inequality shocks, respectively indicated
as low and high. Moreover, a subsidy is introduced in the aftermath of the shock,
in order to grasp the effect of a redistributive policy.
The main conclusions are that the inequality shock persistently worsens the
performance of the economy in terms of aggregate income. This is due to re-
duced aggregate consumption. In fact, with higher inequality, many households
find themselves with an insufficient amount of resources in order to maintain their
consumption habits, such that they ask for credit. The pool of borrowers widens,
and, as the credit availability is limited, the fraction of constrained borrowers in-
creases as well. These credit constrained households are those having the highest
realized marginal propensity to consume in the population, but, as a result of the
increased inequality, they are obliged to consume less than their desired level of
consumption.
The fall in aggregate income is dampened by a higher government spending
which limits the fall in households’ disposable income. In fact, the fraction of
constrained borrowers is, for higher fiscal intensity parameters, relatively lower
and, in turn, aggregate consumption is more sustained.
These results are analogous for the other two inequality shock scenarios as
well. However, the maximum fall experienced by aggregate income is higher, the
higher the level of inequality introduced in the system. This can be explained by
the presence of a higher fraction of credit constrained borrowers in the high in-
equality scenario. In fact, households have similar consumption desires through-
out the income distribution, such that in a more unequal economy, there is a
95
higher portion of households which has not enough internal resources in order to
finance consumption. For what concerns fiscal multipliers, these are lower in the
case in which the personal income share distribution is less skewed. This result
may seem counter-intuitive because higher inequality is associated with higher
aggregate income falls, and thus one would expect a larger fiscal space as well.
However, for high levels of inequality, the structure of the distribution of income
and the presence of a high fraction of credit constrained borrowers impede agents
in repairing their balance sheets and, thus, in increasing consumption, compared
with a low inequality scenario. However, all peak multipliers are in any case
greater than one.
In the scenario in which a subsidy is introduced, the maximum fall in aggregate
income is always lower than in the case without such a policy, for every fiscal
intensity parameter. In fact, the subsidy sustains households’ disposable income
after being negatively hit by the inequality shock, such that they have to ask for
less credit in order to satisfy their consumption plans. In this way, the average
fraction of constrained borrowers is lower. The positive effect of the subsidy is, as
one would expect, stronger the higher the fiscal intensity parameter. In fact, when
the government spends fifty percent of steady-state income, the economy recovers
from the downturn almost completely. Finally, the subsidy is more effective than
direct government expenditure, as indicated by the higher fiscal multipliers.
For what concerns the comparison between different levels of inequality shocks,
it turns out that the subsidy dampens the recession in every scenario. Moreover,
for a given fiscal intensity parameter the fall is lower, the lower is the level of
inequality in the economy. It also emerges that in more unequal economies,
the maximum fiscal multiplier is lower than in less unequal economies. In all
scenarios, the subsidy turns out to be more effective in dampening the magnitude
of the shock than direct government expenditure. Hence, this policy works as an
automatic stabilizer for the economy, lowering the volatility of the system. This is
in line with recent findings by McKay and Reis (2016), for which higher transfers
to the unemployed and poor are indeed effective at lowering the volatility of
aggregate output.
As an extension of the analysis, it could be interesting to investigate what
96
happens when desired consumption is not constant over time. In particular, a
possibility could be to analyze the effects on the system of different consumption
behaviors of low-income households. For example, a recent empirical study per-
formed by Krueger, Mitman and Perri (2016) on the behavior of households in
the aftermath of the recent crisis, shows evidence for a reduction of consumption
by this class of households which is greater in magnitude than the fall in their
income. Another interesting research path to follow could be to introduce rules
for consumption behavior in line with Duesenberry (1949), as based on habits
and on social interdependencies.
It could also be interesting to include different forms of fiscal policy, as a
progressive tax on income and wealth. Another possible extension could be to
analyze what happens in the three different inequality scenarios when the credit
supply increases and to see if the increased indebtedness may amplify the risk for
crisis, even if it initially allows for higher consumption, as for example found by
Cardaci and Saraceno (2015). Otherwise, one could introduce some prudential
policy for which the bank builds a counter-cyclical capital buffer, in line with
Basel III guidelines (BCBS, 2011). Moreover, different consumption goods could
be introduced.
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